Position: There are futures that benchmark-driven AI cannot see
Sharif University of Technology · Penn State University · University of Oxford · University of California, Berkeley · Stanford University · Stanford University // Virtue AI · Oxford · University of Notre Dame · University of Oxford / Martian · Princeton University
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摘要
Breakthroughs often come from ideas we could not have predicted in advance. In biology, this is called exaptation: traits evolved for one function become decisive for another. Scientific progress works similarly, but only if ideas survive periods when they appear uncompetitive by current metrics. This position paper argues that AI's benchmark-centered selection environment, while successful at bypassing complex debates about the nature of intelligence, taxes exaptation. When one selection rule dominates, ideas that do not fit it have nowhere to persist. The cost grows acute as the field shifts from asking can machines exhibit intelligent behavior? to asking can machines exhibit intelligent behavior such that they are aligned, interpretable, and safe? These are philosophically distinct questions that may require discoveries that we cannot specify. We propose mechanisms to restore exaptive capacity without abandoning benchmarking: plural evaluation regimes, protected venues for non-comparable work, long-horizon funding, and training norms that encourage researchers to question selection rules, not only optimize within them.