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ICML 2026PosterAccept (regular)

Fox in the Henhouse: Supply-Chain Backdoor Attacks Against Reinforcement Learning

Shijie Liu, Andrew C. Cullen, Paul MONTAGUE, Sarah Erfani, Benjamin Rubinstein

The University of Melbourne · Defence Science and Technology Group, Australia · University of Melbourne · University​ of Melbourne

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摘要

Existing backdoor attacks on Reinforcement Learning (RL) typically rely on unrealistic white-box access to victim parameters, rewards, or observations. Inspired by real world behaviors, we introduce the Supply-Chain Backdoor (SCAB) attack to demonstrate that such assumptions are unnecessary. SCAB targets the common practice of training with third-party policies, poisoning the dataset solely through a black-box of legitimate agent-environment interactions. With only 3% data corruption, SCAB achieves a 90% attack success rate and reduces victim returns by 80%. These findings expose a critical vulnerability in the modern RL supply chain, highlighting that reliance on untrusted external agents constitutes a severe and practical security risk.