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ICML 2026PosterAccept (regular)

Frontier Models Can Take Actions at Low Probabilities

Alex Serrano Terre, Wen Xing, David Lindner, Erik Jenner

UC Berkeley / Polytechnic University of Catalonia · MATS / Independent · Google DeepMind · University of Amsterdam

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摘要

Pre-deployment evaluations inspect only a limited sample of model actions. A malicious model seeking to evade oversight could exploit this by randomizing when to "defect": misbehaving so rarely that no malicious actions are observed during evaluation, but often enough that they occur eventually in deployment. But this requires taking actions at very low rates, while maintaining calibration. Are frontier models even capable of that? We prompt GPT-5 and Qwen-3 families to take a target action at low probabilities (e.g. 0.01%), either given directly or requiring derivation, and evaluate their calibration (i.e. whether they perform the target action roughly 1 in 10,000 times when resampling). We find that frontier models are surprisingly good at this task. If there is a source of entropy in the context (such as a UUID), they maintain high calibration at rates lower than 1 in 100,000 actions. Without external entropy, some models can still reach rates lower than 1 in 10,000. Larger models achieve good calibration at lower rates. Successful low-rate strategies require explicit Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, so malicious models attempting this approach could currently be caught by a CoT monitor. However, scaling trends suggest future evaluations may be unable to rely on models’ lack of target rate calibration, especially if CoT is no longer legible.