← 返回论文检索
ICML 2026PosterAccept (regular)

The Trojan Knowledge: Bypassing Commercial LLM Guardrails via Harmless Prompt Weaving and Adaptive Tree Search

Rongzhe Wei, Peizhi Niu, Xinjie Shen, Tony Tu, Yifan Li, Ruihan Wu, Eli Chien, Pin-Yu Chen, Olgica Milenkovic, Pan Li

Georgia Institute of Technology · University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign · GaTech & Qwen · University of California, San Diego · National Taiwan University · IBM Research · University of Illinois UC

PDF 由论文原始站点提供,PaperCompass 不保存论文文件。

摘要

Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety guardrails. Existing approaches overwhelmingly operate within the prompt-optimization paradigm; the resulting prompts typically retain malicious semantic signals that modern guardrails are primed to detect. In contrast, we identify a deeper vulnerability stemming from the highly interconnected nature of an LLM’s internal knowledge. This structure allows harmful objectives to be realized by weaving together sequences of benign sub-queries, each of which individually evades detection. To exploit this loophole, we introduce the Correlated Knowledge Attack Agent (CKA-Agent), a dynamic framework that reframes jailbreaking as an adaptive, tree-structured exploration of the target model’s knowledge base. The CKA-Agent issues locally innocuous queries, uses model responses to guide exploration across multiple paths, and ultimately assembles the aggregated information to achieve the original harmful objective. Evaluated across SOTA commercial LLMs, CKA-Agent consistently achieves over 95\% success rates even against strong guardrails, underscoring the severity of this vulnerability and the urgent need for defenses against such knowledge-decomposition attacks. Our codes are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CKA-Agent-ICML