Position: Stop evaluating AI with human tests, develop principled, AI-specific tests instead

摘要

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable results on a range of standardized tests originally designed to assess human cognitive and psychological traits, such as intelligence and personality. While these results are often interpreted as strong evidence of human-like characteristics in LLMs, this paper argues that such interpretations constitute an ontological error. Human psychological and educational tests are theory-driven measurement instruments, calibrated to a specific population. Applying these tests to non-human subjects without empirical validation, risks mischaracterizing what is being measured. Furthermore, a growing trend frames AI performance on benchmarks as measurements of traits such as ``intelligence'', despite known issues with validity, data contamination, cultural bias and sensitivity to superficial prompt changes. We argue that interpreting benchmark performance as measurements of human-like traits, lacks sufficient theoretical and empirical justification. This leads to our position: Stop Evaluating AI with Human Tests, Develop Principled, AI-specific Tests instead. We call for the development of principled, AI-spec by laying out, end-to-end, how valid measurement instruments are constructed and validated and where the ontological error enters when a human-calibrated instrument is applied to LLMs.