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ACL 2026longmain

When Personalization Legitimizes Risks: Uncovering Safety Vulnerabilities in Personalized Dialogue Agents

Jiahe Guo, Xiangran Guo, Yulin Hu, Zimo Long, Xingyu Sui, Xuda Zhi, Yongbo Huang, Hao He, Weixiang Zhao, Yanyan Zhao, Bing Qin

Harbin Institute of Technology

PDF 由论文原始站点提供,PaperCompass 不保存论文文件。DOI 10.18653/v1/2026.acl-long.1260 ↗

摘要

Long-term memory enables large language model (LLM) agents to support personalized and sustained interactions.However, most work on personalized agents prioritizes utility and user experience, treating memory as a neutral component and largely overlooking its safety implications.In this paper, we reveal intent legitimation, a previously underexplored safety failure in personalized agents, where benign personal memories bias intent inference and cause models to legitimize inherently harmful queries.To study this phenomenon, we introduce PS-Bench, a benchmark designed to identify and quantify intent legitimation in personalized interactions.Across multiple memory-augmented agent frameworks and base LLMs, personalization increases attack success rates by **15.8%–243.7%** relative to stateless baselines.We further provide mechanistic evidence for intent legitimation from internal representation space, and propose a lightweight detection–reflection method that effectively reduces safety degradation.Overall, our work provides the first systematic exploration and evaluation of intent legitimation as a safety failure mode that naturally arises from benign, real-world personalization, highlighting the importance of assessing safety under long-term personal context. **WARNING:** This paper may contain harmful content.