Private Mechanism Design via Quantile Estimation

摘要

We investigate the problem of designing differentially private (DP), revenue-maximizing single item auction. Specifically, we consider broadly applicable settings in mechanism design where agents' valuation distributions are **independent**, **non-identical**, and can be either **bounded** or **unbounded**. Our goal is to design such auctions with **pure**, i.e., $(\epsilon,0)$ privacy in polynomial time. In this paper, we propose two computationally efficient auction learning framework that achieves **pure** privacy under bounded and unbounded distribution settings. These frameworks reduces the problem of privately releasing a revenue-maximizing auction to the private estimation of pre-specified quantiles. Our solutions increase the running time by polylog factors compared to the non-private version. As an application, we show how to extend our results to the multi-round online auction setting with non-myopic bidders. To our best knowledge, this paper is the first to efficiently deliver a Myerson auction with **pure** privacy and near-optimal revenue, and the first to provide such auctions for **unbounded** distributions.