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EMNLP 2025mainmain

Your Language Model Can Secretly Write Like Humans: Contrastive Paraphrase Attacks on LLM-Generated Text Detectors

Hao Fang, Jiawei Kong, Tianqu Zhuang, Yixiang Qiu, Kuofeng Gao, Bin Chen, Shu-Tao Xia, Yaowei Wang, Min Zhang

Tsinghua University, Columbia University, University of Massachusetts at Amherst and ByteDance Inc. · Tsinghua University, Tsinghua University, University of Maryland, College Park and The University of Queensland · Tsinghua University · Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen · Shenzhen International Graduate School, Tsinghua University · Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen and Pengcheng Laboratory · Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen and Harbin Institute of Technology

PDF 由论文原始站点提供,PaperCompass 不保存论文文件。DOI 10.18653/v1/2025.emnlp-main.433 ↗

摘要

The misuse of large language models (LLMs), such as academic plagiarism, has driven the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. To bypass these detectors, paraphrase attacks have emerged to purposely rewrite these texts to evade detection. Despite the success, existing methods require substantial data and computational budgets to train a specialized paraphraser, and their attack efficacy greatly reduces when faced with advanced detection algorithms. To address this, we propose Contrastive Paraphrase Attack (CoPA), a training-free method that effectively deceives text detectors using off-the-shelf LLMs. The first step is to carefully craft instructions that encourage LLMs to produce more human-like texts. Nonetheless, we observe that the inherent statistical biases of LLMs can still result in some generated texts carrying certain machine-like attributes that can be captured by detectors. To overcome this, CoPA constructs an auxiliary machine-like word distribution as a contrast to the human-like distribution generated by the LLM. By subtracting the machine-like patterns from the human-like distribution during the decoding process, CoPA is able to produce sentences that are less discernible by text detectors. Our theoretical analysis suggests the superiority of the proposed attack. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of CoPA in fooling text detectors across various scenarios.