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A Little Subsidy Ensures MMS Allocation for Three Agents

Xiaowei Wu, Quan Xue, Shengwei Zhou

PDF 由论文原始站点提供,PaperCompass 不保存论文文件。DOI 10.24963/ijcai.2025/454 ↗

摘要

We consider the problem of fair allocation of m indivisible items to a group of n agents with subsidies (money). We address scenarios where agents have general additive cost/utility functions. Our work primarily focuses on the special case of three agents. Assuming that the maximum cost/utility of an item to an agent can be compensated by one dollar, we demonstrate that a total subsidy of 1/6 dollars is sufficient to ensure the existence of Maximin Share (MMS) allocations for both goods and chores. Additionally, we provide examples to establish the lower bounds of the required subsidies.