GRASP: Hard-Label Black-Box Malware Evasion with Higher Success, Fewer Queries, and Smaller Perturbations

摘要

Machine learning (ML)-based malware detectors are widely deployed but remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, under hard-label black-box access, existing adversarial attacks on Windows Portable Executable (PE) malware are often query-inefficient and incur large file-size inflation. A common paradigm is to predefine a set of semantics-preserving atomic perturbations and search for evasive combinations under only binary feedback. Among these atomic perturbations, (i) those with highly combinatorial search spaces are difficult to explore effectively under hard-label feedback, leaving their potential untapped, and (ii) those relying on transplanting benign fragments are often laden with evasion-irrelevant bytes and exhibit highly variable adversarial utility. We propose Gradient-seeded Reinforcement Learning And Stealthy Pruning (GRASP), a three-stage framework that tackles these challenges. First, we decouple perturbations with highly combinatorial search spaces from the query-based search and instead apply a gradient-seeded warm-up that uses Gumbel-Softmax relaxation to enable gradient-based updates over the discrete space. This yields a strong warm start that improves evasion and reduces queries in later stages. Second, Reinforcement Learning (RL)-based refinement is accelerated by a perturbation library that filters, caches, and reuses compact high-utility patterns, reducing wasted queries on low-utility benign fragments. Third, a perturbation minimization stage removes redundant bytes while preserving evasion, reducing size inflation and feeding compact patterns back to the library. Experiments show that GRASP outperforms baselines, achieving higher attack success with fewer queries and smaller file-size inflation. We additionally demonstrate its practical effectiveness against commercial Antivirus engines.