Super Condorcet Winners and Limit Coalitional Manipulability of IRV

摘要

We study the limit CM rate of single-winner voting rules under Impartial Culture, defined as the probability that a preference profile is coalitionally manipulable in the limit of large electorates. For three candidates, Lepelley and Valognes [1999] derived a closed-form expression for Plurality with Runoff, or equivalently Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV), and showed that its limit CM rate is strictly below one. This is remarkable because Kim and Roush [1996] established a limit of one for several major rules, including Maximin and all positional scoring rules except Veto. In this paper, we generalize the result of Lepelley and Valognes to any number of candidates greater than or equal to four. We show that Plurality with Runoff has a limit CM rate equal to one for all such numbers of candidates, whereas IRV retains a limit CM rate strictly below one. To this end, we rely on the notion of Super Condorcet Winner, recently introduced by Durand [2025], which yields an upper bound on the CM rate of IRV. We prove that this bound is asymptotically tight and compute the probability that a Super Condorcet Winner exists, thereby obtaining the exact limit CM rate of IRV. (Extended version with appendices: https://hal.science/hal-05566713. Short video: https://youtu.be/4i2A7qUP-eo.)