Incentivizing Truthful Machine Unlearning via Hierarchical Auditing

摘要

Machine unlearning has become a critical capability for AI services to comply with evolving privacy regulations. A key yet underexplored challenge is how to verify whether a profit-driven AI server has faithfully performed unlearning. Existing verification approaches either incur prohibitive costs or provide insufficient deterrence, failing to balance audit cost and enforcement effectiveness. To bridge this gap, we propose UAG, a game-theoretic unlearning auditing framework that incentivizes truthful unlearning via strategic deterrence rather than exhaustive verification. We design a hierarchical auditing mechanism that combines low-cost screening with selectively triggered high-precision verification, and models the server-auditor interaction as a three-stage dynamic Bayesian game. By characterizing the equilibrium strategy, we derive optimal audit and penalty policies that incentivize honest unlearning. Theoretical analysis and experiments show that UAG maintains reliable detection while achieving a favorable cost-deterrence trade-off. Notably, UAG attains a server honesty rate of approximately 95% while screening only about 50% of unlearning requests, showing its practicality for trustworthy black-box unlearning services.