← 返回论文检索
The ACM Web Conference 2024Research Track: Economics, Online Markets, and Human Computation

Ad vs Organic: Revisiting Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design in E-commerce Platforms

Ningyuan Li 0001, Yunxuan Ma, Yang Zhao 0039, Qian Wang 0025, Zhilin Zhang 0003, Chuan Yu 0002, Jian Xu 0015, Bo Zheng 0007, Xiaotie Deng

PDF 由论文原始站点提供,PaperCompass 不保存论文文件。DOI 10.1145/3589334.3645638 ↗

摘要

On typical e-commerce platforms, a product can be displayed to users in two possible forms, as an ad item or an organic item. Usually, ad and organic items are separately selected by the advertising system and recommendation system, and then combined by a content merging mechanism. Although the design of the content merging mechanism has been extensively studied, little attention has been given to a crucial situation where there is an overlap between candidate ad and organic items. Despite its common occurrence, this situation is not correctly handled by almost all existing works, potentially leading to incentive problems for advertisers and the violation of economic constraints. To address these issues, we revisit the design of the content merging mechanism. We introduce a necessary property called form stability, and provide simplification results of the mechanism design problem. Furthermore, we design two simple mechanisms strictly ensuring desired economic properties including incentive compatibility, and demonstrate their guaranteed performance through competitive ratio analysis under certain conditions.