Platform Competition in the Autobidding World

摘要

We study the problem of auction design for advertising platforms that face strategic advertisers who are bidding across platforms. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize their total value or conversions while satisfying some constraint(s) across all the platforms they participates in. In this paper, we focus on advertisers with return-over-investment (henceforth, ROI) constraints, i.e. each advertiser is trying to maximize value while making sure that their ROI across all platforms is no less than some target value. An advertiser interacts with the platforms through autobidders -- for each platform, the advertiser strategically chooses a target ROI to report to the platform's autobidder, which in turn uses a uniform bid multiplier to bid on the advertiser's behalf on the queries owned by the given platform. Our main result is an auction comparator theorem that can be used to choose between different auction mechanisms by a revenue-maximizing platform operating in a competitive environment. Analogous to the Linkage Principle for interdependent values, our comparator demonstrates that, for a broad class of advertiser valuations, second-price auctions may sometimes generate higher revenue than first-price auctions. This contrasts sharply with the single-platform setting, where first-price auctions are optimal for both revenue and welfare. Our findings highlight the critical importance of considering inter-platform competition when designing optimal auctions.