A2GBD: Attack-Agnostic Graph Backdoor Defense

摘要

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are vulnerable to graph backdoor attacks, which poses severe risks to their deployment in safety-critical applications. Existing defenses predominantly focus on specific backdoor triggers, making them brittle and unable to generalize across different backdoor triggers with varying properties. Motivated by this limitation, this work proposes an attack-agnostic graph backdoor defense mechanism A2GBD, which does not require prior knowledge of the specific attack strategies (e.g., edge perturbation, node attribute manipulation) to achieve effective defense. A2GBD consists of suspicious node selection and defense strategy generation. The selection module selects high-suspicion nodes to enhance defense awareness, while the defense agent adaptively determines and executes defense strategies. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that A2GBD consistently lowers attack success rates while maintaining high clean accuracy, showing strong robustness and generalizability against diverse graph backdoor attack strategies.