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Applications · Language, Speech and Dialog

Jen-Tse Huang, Eric John Li, Man Ho LAM, Tian Liang, Wenxuan Wang, Youliang Yuan, Wenxiang Jiao, Xing Wang, Zhaopeng Tu, Michael Lyu

Decision-making is a complex process requiring diverse abilities, making it an excellent framework for evaluating Large Language Models (LLMs). Researchers have examined LLMs' decision-making through the lens of Game Theory. However, existing evaluation mainly focus on two-player scenarios where an LLM competes against another. Additionally, previous benchmarks suffer from test set leakage due to their static design. We introduce GAMA($\gamma$)-Bench, a new framework for evaluating LLMs' Gaming Ability in Multi-Agent environments. It includes eight classical game theory scenarios and a dynamic scoring scheme specially designed to quantitatively assess LLMs' performance. $\gamma$-Bench allows flexible game settings and adapts the scoring system to different game parameters, enabling comprehensive evaluation of robustness, generalizability, and strategies for improvement. Our results indicate that GPT-3.5 demonstrates strong robustness but limited generalizability, which can be enhanced using methods like Chain-of-Thought. We also evaluate 13 LLMs from 6 model families, including GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, LLaMA-3.1, Mixtral, and Qwen-2. Gemini-1.5-Pro outperforms others, scoring of $69.8$ out of $100$, followed by LLaMA-3.1-70B ($65.9$) and Mixtral-8x22B ($62.4$). Our code and experimental results are publicly available at https://github.com/CUHK-ARISE/GAMABench.

Social Aspects · Accountability, Transparency and Interpretability

Christopher Musco, R. Teal Witter

Originally introduced in game theory, Shapley values have emerged as a central tool in explainable machine learning, where they are used to attribute model predictions to specific input features. However, computing Shapley values exactly is expensive: for a model with $n$ features, $O(2^n)$ model evaluations are necessary. To address this issue, approximation algorithms are widely used. One of the most popular is the Kernel SHAP algorithm, which is model agnostic and remarkably effective in practice. However, to the best of our knowledge, Kernel SHAP has no strong non-asymptotic complexity guarantees. We address this issue by introducing *Leverage SHAP*, a light-weight modification of Kernel SHAP that provides provably accurate Shapley value estimates with just $O(n\log n)$ model evaluations. Our approach takes advantage of a connection between Shapley value estimation and agnostic active learning by employing *leverage score sampling*, a powerful regression tool. Beyond theoretical guarantees, we show that Leverage SHAP consistently outperforms even the highly optimized implementation of Kernel SHAP available in the ubiquitous SHAP library [Lundberg \& Lee, 2017].

Xiang Fang, Zeyu Xiong, Wanlong Fang, Xiaoye Qu, Chen Chen, Jianfeng Dong, Keke Tang, Pan Zhou, Yu Cheng, Daizong Liu

This paper addresses the challenging task of weakly-supervised video temporal grounding. Existing approaches are generally based on the moment candidate selection pipeline that utilizes contrastive learning and reconstruction paradigm for scoring the pre-defined moments. Although they have achieved significant progress, we argue that their current frameworks have overlooked two indispensable issues: (1) Coarse-grained cross-modal learning: previous methods solely capture the global video-level alignment with the query, failing to model the detailed consistency between video frames and query words for accurately grounding the moment boundaries. (2) Complex moment candidates: the performance of these methods severely relies on the quality of moment candidates, which are also time-consuming and complicated for selection. To this end, in this paper, we make the first attempt to tackle this task from a novel game perspective, which effectively learns the uncertain relationship between each frame-word pair with diverse granularity and flexible combination for fine-grained cross-modal interaction. Specifically, we creatively model each video frame and query word as game players with multivariate cooperative game theory to learn their contribution to the cross-modal similarity score. By quantifying the trend of frame-word cooperation within a coalition via the game-theoretic interaction, we are able to value all uncertain but possible correspondence between frames and words. At last, instead of using moment proposals, we utilize the learned query-guided frame-wise scores for fine-grained moment boundary grounding. Experiments show that our method achieves superior performance on both Charades-STA and ActivityNet Caption datasets.

Wen Luo 0001, Yu Xia 0024, Tianshu Shen, Sujian Li

The rise of social media and the exponential growth of multimodal communication necessitates advanced techniques for Multimodal Information Extraction (MIE). However, existing methodologies primarily rely on direct Image-Text interactions, a paradigm that often faces significant challenges due to semantic and modality gaps between images and text. In this paper, we introduce a new paradigm of Image-Context-Text interaction, where large multimodal models (LMMs) are utilized to generate descriptive textual context to bridge these gaps. In line with this paradigm, we propose a novel Shapley Value-based Contrastive Alignment (Shap-CA) method, which aligns both context-text and context-image pairs. Shap-CA initially applies the Shapley value concept from cooperative game theory to assess the individual contribution of each element in the set of contexts, texts and images towards total semantic and modality overlaps. Following this quantitative evaluation, a contrastive learning strategy is employed to enhance the interactive contribution within context-text/image pairs, while minimizing the influence across these pairs. Furthermore, we design an adaptive fusion module for selective cross-modal fusion. Extensive experiments across four MIE datasets demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods.

Qian Chen 0032, Zilong Wang 0001, Jiaqi Hu 0003, Haonan Yan, Jianying Zhou 0001, Xiaodong Lin 0001

Federated learning (FL) is becoming a major driving force behind machine learning as a service, where customers (clients) collaboratively benefit from shared local updates under the orchestration of the service provider (server). Representing clients' current demands and the server's future demand, local model personalization and global model generalization are separately investigated, as the ill-effects of data heterogeneity enforce the community to focus on one over the other. However, these two seemingly competing goals are of equal importance rather than black and white issues, and should be achieved simultaneously. In this paper, we propose the first algorithm to balance personalization and generalization on top of game theory, dubbed PAGE, which reshapes FL as a co-opetition game between clients and the server. To explore the equilibrium, PAGE further formulates the game as Markov decision processes, and leverages the reinforcement learning algorithm, which simplifies the solving complexity. Extensive experiments on four widespread datasets show that PAGE outperforms state-of-the-art FL baselines in terms of global and local prediction accuracy simultaneously, and the accuracy can be improved by up to 35.20% and 39.91%, respectively. In addition, biased variants of PAGE imply promising adaptiveness to demand shifts in practice.

Yijing Lin, Zhipeng Gao 0001, Hongyang Du 0001, Dusit Niyato, Jiawen Kang 0001, Xiaoyuan Liu 0002

With the development of AI-Generated Content (AIGC), data is becoming increasingly important, while the right of data to be forgotten, which is defined in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and permits data owners to remove information from AIGC models, is also arising. To protect this right in a distributed manner corresponding to federated learning, federated unlearning is employed to eliminate history model updates and unlearn the global model to mitigate data effects from the targeted clients intending to withdraw from training tasks. To diminish centralization failures, the hierarchical federated framework that is distributed and collaborative can be integrated into the unlearning process, wherein each cluster can support multiple AIGC tasks. However, two issues remain unexplored in current federated unlearning solutions: 1) getting remaining clients, those not withdraw from the task, to join the unlearning process, which demands additional resources and notably has fewer benefits than federated learning, particularly in achieving the original performance via alternative unlearning processes and 2) exploring mechanisms for dynamic unlearning in the selection of remaining clients possessing unbalanced data to avoid starting the unlearning from scratch. We initially consider a two-level incentive and unlearning mechanism to address the aforementioned challenges. At the lower level, we utilize evolutionary game theory to model the dynamic participation process, aiming to attract remaining clients to participate in retraining tasks. At the upper level, we integrate deep reinforcement learning into federated unlearning to dynamically select remaining clients to join the unlearning process to mitigate the bias introduced by the unbalanced data distribution among clients. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms outperform comparative methods, enhancing utilities and improving accuracy.

Han Wang, Wenhao Li, Hongyuan Zha, Baoxiang Wang

A carbon market is a market-based tool that incentivizes economic agents to align individual profits with the global utility, i.e., reducing carbon emissions to tackle climate change. Cap and trade stands as a critical principle based on allocating and trading carbon allowances (carbon emission credit), enabling economic agents to follow planned emissions and penalizing excess emissions. A central authority is responsible for introducing and allocating those allowances in cap and trade. However, the complexity of carbon market dynamics makes accurate simulation intractable, which in turn hinders the design of effective allocation strategies. To address this, we propose an adaptive mechanism design framework, simulating the market using hierarchical, model-free multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Government agents allocate carbon credits, while enterprises engage in economic activities and carbon trading. This framework illustrates agents’ behavior comprehensively. Numerical results show MARL enables government agents to balance productivity, equality, and carbon emissions. Our project is available at https: //anonymous.4open.science/r/Carbon-Simulator.

Warut Suksompong

The field of social choice theory investigates how individual preferences are aggregated to reach collective decisions. While traditional social choice addresses problems such as choosing a winning candidate based on voter rankings or fairly allocating resources among individuals with the same entitlement, the wide range of decision-making scenarios in real-world applications calls for an extension beyond these basic frameworks. In this paper, I present an overview of my efforts to expand the reach of social choice theory in the domains of fair division, voting, and tournaments. Furthermore, I discuss avenues and challenges of bringing the developed theory closer to practice.

Hadi Hosseini

The widespread adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems has profoundly reshaped decision-making in social, political, and commercial contexts. This paper explores the critical issue of fairness in AI-driven decision-making, particularly in allocating resources and tasks. By examining recent advancements and key questions in computational social choice, I highlight challenges and prospects in designing fair systems in collective decision-making that are scalable, adaptable to intricate environments, and are aligned with complex and diverse human preferences.

Šimon Schierreich

In my research, I focus on computationally hard problems in the area of computational social choice. I am interested in the study of input restrictions that guarantee the existence of efficient and scalable algorithms that can be of practical interest.

Aniket Murhekar

We investigate the existence and computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible chores to agents with additive preferences. We consider the popular envy-based fairness notions of envy-freeness up to one chore (EF1) and the efficiency notion of Pareto-optimality (PO). The existence of an allocation of chores that is simultaneously EF1 and PO is regarded a major open problem in discrete fair division. We show that an EF1 and PO allocation can be computed in polynomial time for certain structured instances. These results comprise the first non-trivial positive results for the problem and reveal insights towards settling the problem in its full generality.

Ondřej Kubíček

Sequential decision-making under uncertainty in multi-agent environments is a fundamental problem in artificial intelligence. Games serve as a base model for these problems. Finding optimal plans in games that model real-world scenarios necessitates scalable algorithms. In games with perfect information, algorithms that use a combination of search and deep reinforcement learning can scale to arbitrary-sized games and achieve superhuman performance. In games with imperfect information, the situation is more challenging due to the nature of the search. This work aims to develop algorithms that use search but can scale into larger games than currently possible.

Simon Krogmann

Facility location problems have been studied in settings like hospital placement or the competition between stores. In some cases, a central authority coordinates facility placements to optimize metrics like the coverage of an area or emergency response time. In many cases, however, facilities are placed by multiple rational agents to maximize their utility, e.g., the number of clients they attract. In previous research, these games feature simplistic client behavior independent of other clients' strategic choices, e.g., visiting the closest facility. Our goal is to understand what happens if clients also act selfishly, resulting in a two-stage game consisting of strategic facility and client agents. In three recent publications, we investigated such two-stage models for clients that optimize their waiting times. We showed the existence and gave algorithms for (approximate) subgame perfect equilibria, a common extension of Nash equilibria for sequential games. To learn more about this domain, we intend to investigate further natural client behaviors and eventually create a more general model or hierarchy of two-sided facility location games. With this, we aim to make predictions in real-world settings, e.g., the placement of renewable energy infrastructure.

Sanjay Chandlekar

Smart grid system encompasses large power plants in the wholesale market and retail customers in the tariff market. An electricity broker liaises between the wholesale and tariff markets by procuring electricity from the power plants and selling it to subscribed customers. In our work, we address the prominent challenges in the smart grid system to achieve better efficiency. We discuss the wholesale market, for which we design efficient bidding strategies in periodic double auctions (PDAs), and the tariff market, which includes tariff contract generation strategies and peak demand mitigation strategies. We use the PowerTAC simulator as a test-bed; also utilise these strategies for our autonomous broker, VidyutVanika, which has been proven efficient in the PowerTAC tournaments.

Marie Christin Schmidtlein, Ulle Endriss

We develop an approach for collective decision making from first principles. In this approach, rather than using a---necessarily imperfect---voting rule to map any given scenario where individual agents report their preferences into a collective decision, we identify for every concrete such scenario the most appealing set of normative principles (known as axioms in social choice theory) that would entail a unique decision and then implement that decision. We analyse some of the fundamental properties of this new approach, from both an algorithmic and a normative point of view.

Xiang Liu, Hau Chan, Minming Li, Weiwei Wu

In recent decades, the design of budget feasible mechanisms for a wide range of procurement auction settings has received significant attention in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community. These procurement auction settings have practical applications in various domains such as federated learning, crowdsensing, edge computing, and resource allocation. In a basic procurement auction setting of these domains, a buyer with a limited budget is tasked with procuring items (\eg, goods or services) from strategic sellers, who have private information on the true costs of their items and incentives to misrepresent their items' true costs. The primary goal of budget feasible mechanisms is to elicit the true costs from sellers and determine items to procure from sellers to maximize the buyer valuation function for the items and ensure that the total payment to the sellers is no more than the budget. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of key procurement auction settings and results of budget feasible mechanisms. We provide several promising future research directions.

Hadi Hosseini, Shraddha Pathak

Matching markets consist of two disjoint sets of agents, where each agent has a preference list over agents on the other side. The primary objective is to find a stable matching between the agents such that no unmatched pair of agents prefer each other to their matched partners. The incompatibility between stability and strategy-proofness in this domain gives rise to a variety of strategic behavior of agents, which in turn may influence the resulting matching. In this paper, we discuss fundamental properties of stable matchings, review essential structural observations, survey key results in manipulation algorithms and their game-theoretical aspects, and more importantly, highlight a series of open research questions.

Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Simon Rey, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanisław Szufa, Tomasz Wąs

We analyze how numerical experiments regarding elections were conducted within computational social choice literature (focusing on papers published in the IJCAI, AAAI, and AAMAS conferences). We analyze the sizes of the studied elections and the methods of generating preference data, thereby making previously hidden standards and practices explicit. In particular, we survey a number of statistical cultures for generating elections and their commonly used parameters.

Ariyan Bighashdel, Yongzhao Wang, Stephen McAleer, Rahul Savani, Frans A. Oliehoek

Game theory provides a mathematical way to study the interaction between multiple decision makers. However, classical game-theoretic analysis is limited in scalability due to the large number of strategies, precluding direct application to more complex scenarios. This survey provides a comprehensive overview of a framework for large games, known as Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), which holds promise to improve scalability by focusing attention on sufficient subsets of strategies. We first motivate PSRO and provide historical context. We then focus on the strategy exploration problem for PSRO: the challenge of assembling effective subsets of strategies that still represent the original game well with minimum computational cost. We survey current research directions for enhancing the efficiency of PSRO, and explore the applications of PSRO across various domains. We conclude by discussing open questions and future research.

Eline M. Bovy, Marnix Suilen, Sebastian Junges, Nils Jansen

Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) rely on the key assumption that probability distributions are precisely known. Robust POMDPs (RPOMDPs) alleviate this concern by defining imprecise probabilities, referred to as uncertainty sets. While robust MDPs have been studied extensively, work on RPOMDPs is limited and primarily focuses on algorithmic solution methods. We expand the theoretical understanding of RPOMDPs by showing that 1) different assumptions on the uncertainty sets affect optimal policies and values; 2) RPOMDPs have a partially observable stochastic game (POSG) semantic; and 3) the same RPOMDP with different assumptions leads to semantically different POSGs and, thus, different policies and values. These novel semantics for RPOMDPs give access to results for POSGs, studied in game theory; concretely, we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we classify the existing RPOMDP literature using our semantics, clarifying under which uncertainty assumptions these existing works operate.