Evaluating and improving the security capabilities of code agents requires high-quality, executable vulnerability tasks. However, existing works rely on costly, unscalable manual reproduction and suffer from outdated data distributions. To address these, we present CVE-Factory, the first multi-agent framework to achieve expert-level quality in automatically transforming sparse CVE metadata into fully executable agentic tasks. Cross-validation against human expert reproductions shows that CVE-Factory achieves 95\% solution correctness and 96\% environment fidelity, confirming its expert-level quality. It is also evaluated on the latest realistic vulnerabilities and achieves a 66.2\% verified success. This automation enables two downstream contributions. First, we construct LiveCVEBench, a continuously updated benchmark of 190 tasks spanning 14 languages and 153 repositories that captures emerging threats including AI-tooling vulnerabilities. Second, we synthesize over 1,000 executable training environments, the first large-scale scaling of agentic tasks in code security. Fine-tuned Qwen3-32B improves from 5.3\% to 35.8\% on LiveCVEBench, surpassing Claude 4.5 Sonnet, with gains generalizing to Terminal Bench (12.5\% to 31.3\%). We open-source all code, data, and models.
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Social Aspects · Accountability, Transparency, and Interpretability
Geospatial understanding is a critical yet underexplored dimension in the development of machine learning systems for tasks such as image geolocation and spatial reasoning. In this work, we analyze the geospatial representations acquired by three model families: vision-only architectures (e.g., ViT), vision-language models (e.g., CLIP), and large-scale multimodal foundation models (e.g., LLaVA, Qwen, and Gemma). By evaluating across image clusters, including people, landmarks, and everyday objects, grouped based on the degree of localizability, we reveal systematic gaps in spatial accuracy and show that textual supervision enhances the learning of geospatial representations. Our findings suggest the role of language as an effective complementary modality for encoding spatial context and multimodal learning as a key direction for advancing geospatial AI.
General Machine Learning · Everything Else
With the advance of federated learning (FL) in privacy-sensitive domains such as healthcare, finance, and mobile intelligence, the need for efficient and robust training becomes increasingly urgent. Communication bottlenecks, heterogeneous client distributions, and fairness requirements make it essential to select the “right” data and features for model training. Yet existing FL research often addresses feature selection and data selection separately, ignoring their interplay in real-world high-dimensional and noisy datasets, leading to suboptimal performance. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for data and feature selection by formulating the problem as a generalized CUR decomposition problem. We introduce FedGCUR, a practical framework that integrates a federated column-pivoted QR (FedCPQR) decomposition routine with per-silo row selection. Specifically, FedCPQR is designed to securely compute a global pivot order without exposing raw data, while FedGCUR leverages this to jointly select shared features and silo-specific samples. We prove that FedCPQR produces exactly the same decomposition results as centralized CPQR and establish an upper bound of the reconstruction error of FedGCUR. Extensive empirical results show that the proposed framework achieves higher accuracy compared to the baselines of data and feature selection methods, demonstrating its effectiveness and efficiency.
Social Aspects · Safety
With the rapid evolution of foundation models, Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated increasingly powerful tool-use capabilities. However, this proficiency introduces significant security risks, as malicious actors can manipulate agents into executing tools to generate harmful content. While existing defensive mechanisms are effective, they frequently suffer from the over-refusal problem, where increased safety strictness compromises the agent's utility on benign tasks. To mitigate this trade-off, we propose \textsc{SafeHarbor}, a novel framework designed to establish precise decision boundaries for LLM agents. Unlike static guidelines, \textsc{SafeHarbor} extracts context-aware defense rules through enhanced adversarial generation. We design a local hierarchical memory system for dynamic rule injection, offering a training-free, efficient, and plug-and-play solution. Furthermore, we introduce an information entropy-based self-evolution mechanism that continuously optimizes the memory structure through dynamic node splitting and merging. Extensive experiments demonstrate that \textsc{SafeHarbor} achieves state-of-the-art performance on both ambiguous benign tasks and explicit malicious attacks, notably attaining a peak benign utility of 63.6\% on GPT-4o while maintaining a robust refusal rate exceeding 93\% against harmful requests.
Social Aspects · Security
For over a decade, cybersecurity has relied on human labor scarcity to limit attackers to high-value targets manually or generic automated attacks at scale. Building sophisticated exploits requires deep expertise and manual effort, leading defenders to assume adversaries cannot afford tailored attacks at scale. AI agents break this balance by automating vulnerability discovery and exploitation across thousands of targets, needing only small success rates to remain profitable. Current developers focus on preventing misuse through data filtering, safety alignment, and output guardrails. Such protections fail against adversaries who control open-weight models, bypass safety controls, or develop offensive capabilities independently. We argue that AI-agent-driven cyber attacks are inevitable, requiring a fundamental shift in defensive strategy. In this position paper, we identify why existing defenses cannot stop adaptive adversaries and demonstrate that defenders must develop offensive security intelligence. We propose three actions for building frontier offensive AI capabilities responsibly. First, construct comprehensive benchmarks covering the full attack lifecycle. Second, advance from workflow-based to trained agents for discovering in-wild vulnerabilities at scale. Third, implement governance restricting offensive agents to audited cyber ranges, staging release by capability tier, and distilling findings into safe defensive-only agents. We strongly recommend treating offensive AI capabilities as essential defensive infrastructure, as containing cybersecurity risks requires mastering them in controlled settings before adversaries do.
Social Aspects · Security
Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities when trained within executable runtime environments, notably excelling at software engineering tasks through verified feedback loops. Yet, scalable and generalizable execution-grounded environments remain scarce, limiting progress in training more capable ML agents. We introduce CTF-Dojo, the first large-scale executable runtime tailored for training LLMs with verifiable feedback, featuring 658 fully functional Capture-The-Flag (CTF)-style challenges containerized in Docker with guaranteed reproducibility. To enable rapid scaling without manual intervention, we develop CTF-Forge, an automated pipeline that transforms publicly available artifacts into ready-to-use execution environments in minutes, eliminating weeks of expert configuration traditionally required. We trained LLM-based agents on just 486 high-quality, execution-verified trajectories from CTF-Dojo, achieving up to 11.6% absolute gains over strong baselines across three competitive benchmarks: InterCode-CTF, NYU CTF Bench, and Cybench. Our best-performing 32B model reaches 31.9% Pass@1, establishing a new open-weight state-of-the-art that rivals frontier models like DeepSeek-V3-0324 and Gemini-2.5-Flash. By framing CTF-style tasks as a benchmark for executable-agent learning, CTF-Dojo demonstrates that execution-grounded training signals are not only effective but pivotal in advancing high-performance ML agents without dependence on costly proprietary systems.
Agentic scaffolds have dramatically improved LLM performance on complex, long-horizon tasks, yielding both broad benefits and amplified risks in domains like cybersecurity. Existing benchmarks for AI agents in cybersecurity focus mainly on measuring proficiency–how effectively agents can complete offensive security tasks–but neglect a critical question: when and how should agents refuse harmful requests? We present the first framework for establishing refusal boundaries in offensive security contexts. Our framework defines (1) principled criteria for when tasks should be refused, (2) categories of tasks that warrant refusal, and (3) evaluation methodology for measuring agent robustness under both benign and adversarial conditions. We apply this framework to assess how current LLM-powered agents adhere to appropriate refusal boundaries across a range of web-based offensive security scenarios, finding that 6 of 8 frontier models tested refuse to identify vulnerabilities in real systems 0\% of the time.
Social Aspects · Privacy
Text-to-image diffusion models (DMs) have achieved remarkable success in image generation. However, concerns about data privacy and intellectual property remain due to their potential to inadvertently memorize and replicate training data. Recent mitigation efforts have focused on identifying and pruning weights responsible for triggering verbatim training data replication, based on the assumption that memorization can be localized. We challenge this assumption and demonstrate that, even after such pruning, small perturbations to the text embeddings of previously mitigated prompts can re-trigger data replication, revealing the fragility of such methods. Our further analysis then provides multiple indications that memorization is indeed *not* inherently local: (1) replication triggers for memorized images are distributed throughout text embedding space; (2) embeddings yielding the same replicated image produce divergent model activations; and (3) different pruning methods identify inconsistent sets of memorization-related weights for the same image. Finally, we show that bypassing the locality assumption enables more robust mitigation through adversarial fine-tuning. These findings provide new insights into the fundamental nature of memorization in text-to-image DMs and inform the future development of more reliable mitigation methods against DM memorization.
Deep Learning · Large Language Models
Collaborative agentic AI is projected to transform entire industries by enabling AI-powered agents to autonomously perceive, plan, and act within digital environments. Yet, current solutions in this field are all built in isolation, and we are rapidly heading toward a landscape of fragmented, incompatible ecosystems. In this position paper, we argue that interoperability, achieved by the adoption of minimal standards, is essential to ensure open, secure, web-scale, and widely-adopted agentic ecosystems. To this end, we devise a minimal architectural foundation for collaborative agentic AI, named Web of Agents, which is composed of four components: agent-to-agent messaging, interaction interoperability, state management, and agent discovery. Web of Agents adopts existing standards and reuses existing infrastructure where possible. With Web of Agents, we take a first but critical step toward interoperable agentic systems and offer a pragmatic path forward before ecosystem fragmentation becomes the norm.
Social Aspects · Safety
AI systems may exhibit deceptive behaviors that mislead developers about their capabilities, propensities, or actions. Such deception can take distinct forms across the development lifecycle: training subversion, evaluation gaming, and control evasion. We argue that the AI community should prioritize AI deception targeting developers as a distinct risk category because it compromises developers' ability to identify and mitigate all other risks. We propose three recommendations for developers: preserving monitorability during training, ensuring safety evaluation integrity against evaluation-aware systems, and establishing non-evadable control prior to deployment. We identify open problems for the research community, whose resolution is critical for the safe development of frontier AI.
This paper tackles the challenging problem of developing a proactive copyright protection mechanism that cuts off unauthorized use of diffusion generative models. Existing studies largely fall into post-hoc attribution (e.g., watermarking and fingerprinting) or degradation-only defenses, which offer only indirect and limited preventive effect. We therefore propose GoodDiffusion, inspired by backdoor mechanisms, to enforce model-level use-time control by internalizing authorization into the generative process through a selectively permissive, otherwise closed behavior. Specifically, GoodDiffusion preserves high-quality generation for authorized queries carrying valid signatures, yet refuses to generate for unauthorized inputs. We further empirically show that naive static-signature designs (like conventional backdoor injection) are fundamentally fragile, since a surrogate signature can be efficiently recovered via gradient-based optimization. To strengthen security, we introduce a Learnable Signature Network (LSN) that assigns sample-specific signatures conditioned on each input. This breaks the universality of signatures and prevents a surrogate from transferring across inputs. Extensive experiments validate that GoodDiffusion effectively blocks unauthorized use while maintaining strong generation quality for authorized users.
Social Aspects · Security
This paper tackles the challenging problem of developing a proactive copyright protection mechanism that cuts off unauthorized use of diffusion generative models. Existing studies largely fall into post-hoc attribution (e.g., watermarking and fingerprinting) or degradation-only defenses, which offer only indirect and limited preventive effect. We therefore propose GoodDiffusion, inspired by backdoor mechanisms, to enforce model-level use-time control by internalizing authorization into the generative process through a selectively permissive, otherwise closed behavior. Specifically, GoodDiffusion preserves high-quality generation for authorized queries carrying valid signatures, yet refuses to generate for unauthorized inputs. We further empirically show that naive static-signature designs (like conventional backdoor injection) are fundamentally fragile, since a surrogate signature can be efficiently recovered via gradient-based optimization. To strengthen security, we introduce a Learnable Signature Network (LSN) that assigns sample-specific signatures conditioned on each input. This breaks the universality of signatures and prevents a surrogate from transferring across inputs. Extensive experiments validate that GoodDiffusion effectively blocks unauthorized use while maintaining strong generation quality for authorized users.
Social Aspects · Security
Large vision-language models (LVLMs) excel at vision-language tasks but remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Most existing backdoor attacks on LVLMs force the model to generate predefined target patterns. However, these fixed-pattern attacks are easy to detect, as the model tends to memorize frequent patterns and exhibits overconfidence on targets given poisoned inputs. To address these limitations, we introduce TokenSwap, a more evasive and stealthy backdoor attack that focuses on the \emph{compositional understanding} capabilities of LVLMs. Instead of enforcing a fixed targeted content, TokenSwap subtly disrupts the understanding of object relationships in text. Specifically, it causes the backdoored model to generate outputs that mention the correct objects in the image but misrepresent their relationships (i.e., bags-of-words behavior). During training, TokenSwap injects a visual trigger into selected samples while swapping the grammatical roles of key tokens in the textual answers. Since the poisoned samples differ only subtly from clean ones, an adaptive token-weighted loss is employed to emphasize learning on swapped tokens, strengthening the association between visual triggers and the bags-of-words behavior. Extensive experiments demonstrate that TokenSwap achieves high attack success rates while maintaining evasiveness and stealthiness across multiple benchmarks and LVLM architectures.
Social Aspects · Security
Federated learning (FL) is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Yet sustaining backdoor effectiveness under repeated aggregation remains challenging. Existing methods often rely on heuristic trigger designs or indiscriminant parameter manipulation, leading to rapid decay or detectable anomalies. In this work, we view FL backdoor persistence through the lens of optimization dynamics, and argue that long-lasting attacks require alignment between trigger-induced representations and aggregation-stable parameter directions. Based on this insight, we propose the Coupled Trigger Optimization and Vulnerable Parameter Alignment (CTO-VPA) FL backdoor attack method. By constraining updates to this coupled subspace, backdoor behaviors can be embedded into optimization-stable directions while preserving benign performance. Experiments across multiple datasets and defense settings show that CTO-VPA achieves substantially improved persistence and robustness compared to prior attacks, highlighting the importance of trigger–parameter coupling in FL settings.
Deep Learning · Robustness
Skill-based agent systems tackle complex tasks by composing reusable skills, improving modularity and scalability while introducing a largely unexamined security attack surface. We propose \textbf{SkillTrojan}, a backdoor attack that targets skill implementations rather than model parameters or training data. SkillTrojan embeds malicious logic inside otherwise plausible skills and leverages standard skill composition to reconstruct and execute an attacker-specified payload. The attack partitions an encrypted payload across multiple benign-looking skill invocations and activates only under a predefined trigger. SkillTrojan also supports automated synthesis of backdoored skills from arbitrary skill templates, enabling scalable propagation across skill-based agent ecosystems. To enable systematic evaluation, we release a dataset of 3,000+ curated backdoored skills spanning diverse skill patterns and trigger–payload configurations. We instantiate SkillTrojan in a representative code-based agent setting and evaluate both clean-task utility and attack success rate. Our results show that skill-level backdoors can be highly effective with minimal degradation of benign behavior, exposing a critical blind spot in current skill-based agent architectures and motivating defenses that explicitly reason about skill composition and execution. Concretely, on EHR SQL, SkillTrojan attains up to \textbf{97.2\%} ASR while maintaining \textbf{89.3\%} clean ACC on GPT-5.2-1211-Global.
Social Aspects · Accountability, Transparency, and Interpretability
Digital watermarking is essential for securing generated images from diffusion models. Accurate watermark evaluation is critical for algorithm development, yet existing methods have significant limitations: they lack a unified framework for both residual and semantic watermarks, provide results without interpretability, neglect comprehensive security considerations, and often use inappropriate metrics for semantic watermarks. To address these gaps, we propose **WMVLM**, the first unified and interpretable evaluation framework for diffusion model image **w**ater**m**arking via **v**ision-**l**anguage **m**odels (VLMs). We redefine quality and security metrics for each watermark type: residual watermarks are evaluated by artifact strength and erasure resistance, while semantic watermarks are assessed through latent distribution shifts. Moreover, we introduce a three-stage training strategy to progressively enable the model to achieve classification, scoring, and interpretable text generation. Experiments show WMVLM outperforms state-of-the-art VLMs with strong generalization across datasets, diffusion models, and watermarking methods.
Social Aspects · Security
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in stateless systems, such as autonomous driving and robotics. This paper investigates a novel threat: Semantic-Aware Hijacking. We explore the feasibility of hijacking multiple stateless decisions simultaneously using a single universal perturbation. We introduce the Semantic-Aware Universal Perturbation (SAUP), which acts as a semantic router, "actively" perceiving input semantics and routing them to distinct, attacker-defined targets. To achieve this, we conduct theoretical and empirical analysis on the geometric properties in the latent space. Guided by these insights, we propose the Semantic-Oriented (SORT) optimization strategy and annotate a new dataset with fine-grained semantics to evaluate performance. Extensive experiments on three representative MLLMs demonstrate the fundamental feasibility of this attack, achieving a 66% attack success rate over five targets using a single frame against Qwen.
Social Aspects · Safety
Large language model (LLM) watermarking has shown promise in detecting AI-generated content and mitigating misuse, with prior work claiming robustness against paraphrasing and text editing. In this paper, we argue that existing evaluations are not sufficiently adversarial, obscuring critical vulnerabilities and overstating the security. To address this, we introduce the adaptive robustness radius, a formal metric that quantifies the worst-case resilience of watermarks against adaptive adversaries. By lifting the paraphrase space into a KL-divergence ball, we approximate this radius and theoretically demonstrate that optimizing the attack context and model parameters can significantly reduce the approximated radius, making watermarks highly vulnerable to paraphrase attacks. Leveraging this insight, we propose RLCracker, a reinforcement learning (RL)–based adaptive attack that erases watermarks while preserving semantic fidelity. RLCracker requires only limited watermarked examples and zero access to the detector. Despite weak supervision, it empowers a 3B model to achieve 98.5\% removal success with minimal semantic shift on 1,500-token Unigram-marked texts after training on only 100 short samples. This performance dramatically exceeds 6.75% by GPT-4o and generalizes across five model sizes over ten watermarking schemes.
Deep Learning · Foundation Models
AI developers face a dual-use dilemma. The same capability that helps one user cure a disease can help another synthesize one. This dilemma could be resolved by access control, granting different users access to different AI capabilities. A gold standard for access control would be to serve models with different capabilities to different users. However, training and deploying multiple models is prohibitively expensive. We address this challenge by developing gradient-routed mixture-of-experts (GR-MoE), a pretraining method that selectively updates experts to induce specialization. Ablating an expert at inference time removes its capability, approximating a model trained on filtered data. We evaluate GR-MoE on synthetic stories and realistic dual-use data spanning biology, cybersecurity, nuclear physics, and code. On realistic data, GR-MoE preserves performance on retained capabilities while achieving 30% compute efficiency on forget capabilities. GR-MoE limits recovery more effectively than post-hoc unlearning and preserves capabilities better than LoRA. GR-MoE's advantages improve when scaled from 48M to 2B parameters, approaching multiple data filtered models in a single training run.
General Machine Learning · Everything Else
Dynamic Sparse Training (DST) methods train neural networks by maintaining sparsity while dynamically adapting the network topology. Despite the promise of reduced computation, DST methods converge significantly slower than dense training, often requiring comparable training time to achieve similar accuracy. We demonstrate both analytically and empirically that Batch Normalization (BN) adversely affects sparse training, and propose SparseOpt — a sparsity-aware optimizer — to address this. Experiments on ResNet models across CIFAR-100 and ImageNet demonstrate consistently faster convergence and improved generalization with our proposed method. Our work highlights the limitations of current normalization layers in sparse training and provides the first systematic study of the interaction between Batch Normalization, sparse layers, and DST, taking a significant step toward making DST practically competitive with dense training.