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Theory/Game Theory

Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm

Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent settings. In this paper, we characterize the convergence of optimistic gradient descent (OGD) in time-varying games. Our framework yields sharp convergence bounds for the equilibrium gap of OGD in zero-sum games parameterized on natural variation measures of the sequence of games, subsuming known results for static games. Furthermore, we establish improved second-order variation bounds under strong convexity-concavity, as long as each game is repeated multiple times. Our results also apply to time-varying general-sum multi-player games via a bilinear formulation of correlated equilibria, which has novel implications for meta-learning and for obtaining refined variation-dependent regret bounds, addressing questions left open in prior papers. Finally, we leverage our framework to also provide new insights on dynamic regret guarantees in static games.

Theory/Game Theory

Victor Boone, Panayotis Mertikopoulos

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite N-player games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of play under no-regret learning converge to the game’s set of coarse correlated equilibria; however, our understanding of how the players' _actual strategies_ evolve over time is much more limited – and, in many cases, non-existent. This issue is exacerbated further by a series of recent results showing that _only_ strict Nash equilibria are stable and attracting under regularized learning, thus making the relation between learning and _pointwise_ solution concepts particularly elusive. In lieu of this, we take a more general approach and instead seek to characterize the _setwise_ rationality properties of the players' day-to-day trajectory of play. To do so, we focus on one of the most stringent criteria of setwise strategic stability, namely that any unilateral deviation from the set in question incurs a cost to the deviator – a property known as _closedness under better replies_ (club). In so doing, we obtain a remarkable equivalence between strategic and dynamic stability: _a product of pure strategies is closed under better replies if and only if its span is stable and attracting under regularized learning._ In addition, we estimate the rate of convergence to such sets, and we show that methods based on entropic regularization (like the exponential weights algorithm) converge at a geometric rate, while projection-based methods converge within a finite number of iterations, even with bandit, payoff-based feedback.

Theory/Game Theory

Iosif Sakos, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Georgios Piliouras

A wide array of modern machine learning applications – from adversarial models to multi-agent reinforcement learning – can be formulated as non-cooperative games whose Nash equilibria represent the system’s desired operational states. Despite having a highly non-convex loss landscape, many cases of interest possess a latent convex structure that could potentially be leveraged to yield convergence to an equilibrium. Driven by this observation, our paper proposes a flexible first-order method that successfully exploits such “hidden structures” and achieves convergence under minimal assumptions for the transformation connecting the players’ control variables to the game’s latent, convex-structured layer. The proposed method – which we call preconditioned hidden gradient descent (PHGD) – hinges on a judiciously chosen gradient preconditioning scheme related to natural gradient methods. Importantly, we make no separability assumptions for the game’s hidden structure, and we provide explicit convergence rate guarantees for both deterministic and stochastic environments.

Theory/Game Theory

Caspar Oesterheld, Johannes Treutlein, Roger Grosse, Vincent Conitzer, Jakob Foerster

As machine learning agents act more autonomously in the world, they will increasingly interact with each other. Unfortunately, in many social dilemmas like the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, standard game theory predicts that ML agents will fail to cooperate with each other. Prior work has shown that one way to enable cooperative outcomes in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma is to make the agents mutually transparent to each other, i.e., to allow them to access one another’s source code (Rubinstein, 1998; Tennenholtz, 2004) – or weights in the case of ML agents. However, full transparency is often unrealistic, whereas partial transparency is commonplace. Moreover, it is challenging for agents to learn their way to cooperation in the full transparency setting. In this paper, we introduce a more realistic setting in which agents only observe a single number indicating how similar they are to each other. We prove that this allows for the same set of cooperative outcomes as the full transparency setting. We also demonstrate experimentally that cooperation can be learned using simple ML methods.

Theory/Game Theory

Lauren Conger, Franca Hoffmann, Eric Mazumdar, Lillian Ratliff

We propose a novel framework for analyzing the dynamics of distribution shift in real-world systems that captures the feedback loop between learning algorithms and the distributions on which they are deployed. Prior work largely models feedback-induced distribution shift as adversarial or via an overly simplistic distribution-shift structure. In contrast, we propose a coupled partial differential equation model that captures fine-grained changes in the distribution over time by accounting for complex dynamics that arise due to strategic responses to algorithmic decision-making, non-local endogenous population interactions, and other exogenous sources of distribution shift. We consider two common settings in machine learning: cooperative settings with information asymmetries, and competitive settings where a learner faces strategic users. For both of these settings, when the algorithm retrains via gradient descent, we prove asymptotic convergence of the retraining procedure to a steady-state, both in finite and in infinite dimensions, obtaining explicit rates in terms of the model parameters. To do so we derive new results on the convergence of coupled PDEs that extends what is known on multi-species systems. Empirically, we show that our approach captures well-documented forms of distribution shifts like polarization and disparate impacts that simpler models cannot capture.

Theory/Game Theory

Brian Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen McAleer, Andreas Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated, communication, and certification equilibria. We observe that optimal equilibria are minimax equilibrium strategies of a player in an extensive-form zero-sum game. This reformulation allows to apply techniques for learning in zero-sum games, yielding the first learning dynamics that converge to optimal equilibria, not only in empirical averages, but also in iterates. We demonstrate the practical scalability and flexibility of our approach by attaining state-of-the-art performance in benchmark tabular games, and by computing an optimal mechanism for a sequential auction design problem using deep reinforcement learning.

Theory/Game Theory

Aniket Murhekar, Zhuowen Yuan, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Bo Li, Ruta Mehta

Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a powerful scheme to facilitate the collaborative learning of models amongst a set of agents holding their own private data. Although the agents benefit from the global model trained on shared data, by participating in federated learning, they may also incur costs (related to privacy and communication) due to data sharing. In this paper, we model a collaborative FL framework, where every agent attempts to achieve an optimal trade-off between her learning payoff and data sharing cost. We show the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) under mild assumptions on agents' payoff and costs. Furthermore, we show that agents can discover the NE via best response dynamics. However, some of the NE may be bad in terms of overall welfare for the agents, implying little incentive for some fraction of the agents to participate in the learning. To remedy this, we design a budget-balanced mechanism involving payments to the agents, that ensures that any $p$-mean welfare function of the agents' utilities is maximized at NE. In addition, we introduce a FL protocol FedBR-BG that incorporates our budget-balanced mechanism, utilizing best response dynamics. Our empirical validation on MNIST and CIFAR-10 substantiates our theoretical analysis. We show that FedBR-BG outperforms the basic best-response-based protocol without additional incentivization, the standard federated learning protocol FedAvg, as well as a recent baseline MWFed in terms of achieving superior $p$-mean welfare.

Theory/Game Theory

Gabriele Farina, Charilaos Pipis

No-regret learners seek to minimize the difference between the loss they cumulated through the actions they played, and the loss they would have cumulated in hindsight had they consistently modified their behavior according to some strategy transformation function. The size of the set of transformations considered by the learner determines a natural notion of rationality. As the set of transformations each learner considers grows, the strategies played by the learners recover more complex game-theoretic equilibria, including correlated equilibria in normal-form games and extensive-form correlated equilibria in extensive-form games. At the extreme, a no-swap-regret agent is one that minimizes regret against the set of all functions from the set of strategies to itself. While it is known that the no-swap-regret condition can be attained efficiently in nonsequential (normal-form) games, understanding what is the strongest notion of rationality that can be attained efficiently in the worst case in sequential (extensive-form) games is a longstanding open problem. In this paper we provide a positive result, by showing that it is possible, in any sequential game, to retain polynomial-time (in the game tree size) iterations while achieving sublinear regret with respect to all linear transformations of the mixed strategy space, a notion called no-linear-swap regret. This notion of hindsight rationality is as strong as no-swap-regret in nonsequential games, and stronger than no-trigger-regret in sequential games—thereby proving the existence of a subset of extensive-form correlated equilibria robust to linear deviations, which we call linear-deviation correlated equilibria, that can be approached efficiently.

Theory/Game Theory

Fabian Fumagalli, Maximilian Muschalik, Patrick Kolpaczki, Eyke Hüllermeier, Barbara Hammer

Predominately in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) research, the Shapley value (SV) is applied to determine feature attributions for any black box model. Shapley interaction indices extend the SV to define any-order feature interactions. Defining a unique Shapley interaction index is an open research question and, so far, three definitions have been proposed, which differ by their choice of axioms. Moreover, each definition requires a specific approximation technique. Here, we propose SHAPley Interaction Quantification (SHAP-IQ), an efficient sampling-based approximator to compute Shapley interactions for arbitrary cardinal interaction indices (CII), i.e. interaction indices that satisfy the linearity, symmetry and dummy axiom. SHAP-IQ is based on a novel representation and, in contrast to existing methods, we provide theoretical guarantees for its approximation quality, as well as estimates for the variance of the point estimates. For the special case of SV, our approach reveals a novel representation of the SV and corresponds to Unbiased KernelSHAP with a greatly simplified calculation. We illustrate the computational efficiency and effectiveness by explaining language, image classification and high-dimensional synthetic models.

Miscellaneous Aspects of Machine Learning/Online Learning, Active Learning and Bandits

Yu-Hu Yan, Peng Zhao, Zhi-Hua Zhou

In this paper, we propose an online convex optimization approach with two different levels of adaptivity. On a higher level, our approach is agnostic to the unknown types and curvatures of the online functions, while at a lower level, it can exploit the unknown niceness of the environments and attain problem-dependent guarantees. Specifically, we obtain $\mathcal{O}(\log V_T)$, $\mathcal{O}(d \log V_T)$ and $\hat{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{V_T})$ regret bounds for strongly convex, exp-concave and convex loss functions, respectively, where $d$ is the dimension, $V_T$ denotes problem-dependent gradient variations and the $\hat{\mathcal{O}}(\cdot)$-notation omits $\log V_T$ factors. Our result not only safeguards the worst-case guarantees but also directly implies the small-loss bounds in analysis. Moreover, when applied to adversarial/stochastic convex optimization and game theory problems, our result enhances the existing universal guarantees. Our approach is based on a multi-layer online ensemble framework incorporating novel ingredients, including a carefully designed optimism for unifying diverse function types and cascaded corrections for algorithmic stability. Notably, despite its multi-layer structure, our algorithm necessitates only one gradient query per round, making it favorable when the gradient evaluation is time-consuming. This is facilitated by a novel regret decomposition equipped with carefully designed surrogate losses.

Theory/Game Theory

Simone Fioravanti, Michele Flammini, Bojana Kodric, Giovanna Varricchio

Hedonic Games (HGs) are a classical framework modeling coalition formation of strategic agents guided by their individual preferences. According to these preferences, it is desirable that a coalition structure (i.e. a partition of agents into coalitions) satisfies some form of stability. The most well-known and natural of such notions is arguably core-stability. Informally, a partition is core-stable if no subset of agents would like to deviate by regrouping in a so-called core-blocking coalition. Unfortunately, core-stable partitions seldom exist and even when they do, it is often computationally intractable to find one. To circumvent these problems, we propose the notion of $\varepsilon$-fractional core-stability, where at most an $\varepsilon$-fraction of all possible coalitions is allowed to core-block. It turns out that such a relaxation may guarantee both existence and polynomial-time computation. Specifically, we design efficient algorithms returning an $\varepsilon$-fractional core-stable partition, with $\varepsilon$ exponentially decreasing in the number of agents, for two fundamental classes of HGs: Simple Fractional and Anonymous. From a probabilistic point of view, being the definition of $\varepsilon$-fractional core equivalent to requiring that uniformly sampled coalitions core-block with probability lower than $\varepsilon$, we further extend the definition to handle more complex sampling distributions. Along this line, when valuations have to be learned from samples in a PAC-learning fashion, we give positive and negative results on which distributions allow the efficient computation of outcomes that are $\varepsilon$-fractional core-stable with arbitrarily high confidence.

Theory/Reinforcement Learning and Planning

Yuanhao Wang, Qinghua Liu, Chi Jin

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.