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2,111篇论文匹配“Security”
第 36 / 106 页

Zeyi Liao, Jaylen Jones, Linxi Jiang, Yuting Ning, Eric Fosler-Lussier, Yu Su, ZHIQIANG LIN, Huan Sun

Computer-use agents (CUAs) promise to automate complex tasks across operating systems (OS) and the web, but remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious content into the environment to hijack agent behavior. Current evaluations of this threat either lack support for adversarial testing in realistic but controlled environments or ignore hybrid web-OS attack scenarios involving both interfaces. To address this, we propose RedTeamCUA, an adversarial testing framework featuring a novel hybrid sandbox that integrates a VM-based OS environment with Docker-based web platforms. Our sandbox supports key features tailored for red teaming, such as flexible adversarial scenario configuration, and a setting that decouples adversarial evaluation from navigational limitations of CUAs by initializing tests directly at the point of an adversarial injection. Using RedTeamCUA, we develop RTC-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark with 864 examples that investigate realistic, hybrid web-OS attack scenarios and fundamental security vulnerabilities. Benchmarking current frontier CUAs identifies significant vulnerabilities: Claude 3.7 Sonnet | CUA demonstrates an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 42.9%, while Operator, the most secure CUA evaluated, still exhibits an ASR of 7.6%. Notably, CUAs often attempt to execute adversarial tasks with an Attempt Rate as high as 92.5%, although failing to complete them due to capability limitations. Nevertheless, we observe concerning ASRs of up to 50% in realistic end-to-end settings, indicating that CUA threats can already result in tangible risks to users and computer systems. Overall, RedTeamCUA provides an essential framework for advancing realistic, controlled, and systematic analysis of CUA vulnerabilities, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses to indirect prompt injection prior to real-world deployment.

Social Aspects · Trustworthy Machine Learning

Naufal Suryanto, Muzammal Naseer, Pengfei Li, Syed Talal Wasim, Jinhui Yi, Juergen Gall, Paolo Ceravolo, Ernesto Damiani

Cybersecurity operations demand assistant LLMs that support diverse workflows without exposing sensitive data. Existing solutions either rely on proprietary APIs with privacy risks or on open models lacking domain adaptation. To bridge this gap, we curate 11.8B tokens of cybersecurity-focused continual pretraining data via large-scale web filtering and manual collection of high-quality resources, spanning 28.6K documents across frameworks, offensive techniques, and security tools. Building on this, we design an agentic augmentation pipeline that simulates expert workflows to generate 266K multi-turn cybersecurity samples for supervised fine-tuning. Combined with general open-source LLM data, these resources enable the training of RedSage, an open-source, locally deployable cybersecurity assistant with domain-aware pretraining and post-training. To rigorously evaluate the models, we introduce RedSage-Bench, a benchmark with 30K multiple-choice and 240 open-ended Q\&A items covering cybersecurity knowledge, skills, and tool expertise. RedSage is further evaluated on established cybersecurity benchmarks (e.g., CTI-Bench, CyberMetric, SECURE) and general LLM benchmarks to assess broader generalization. At the 8B scale, RedSage achieves consistently better results, surpassing the baseline models by up to +5.59 points on cybersecurity benchmarks and +5.05 points on Open LLM Leaderboard tasks. These findings demonstrate that domain-aware agentic augmentation and pre/post-training can not only enhance cybersecurity-specific expertise but also help to improve general reasoning and instruction-following. Project page: https://risys-lab.github.io/RedSage/

Social Aspects · Fairness, Equity, Justice and Safety

Mikhail Terekhov, Alexander Panfilov, Daniil Dzenhaliou, Caglar Gulcehre, Maksym Andriushchenko, Ameya Prabhu, Jonas Geiping

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study \textit{adaptive} attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-$n$ attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

Social Aspects · Fairness, Equity, Justice and Safety

Hyunjun Jeon, Kyuyoung Kim, Jinwoo Shin

Modern language models can readily extract sensitive information from unstructured text, making redaction—the selective removal of such information—critical for data security. However, existing benchmarks for redaction typically focus on predefined categories of data such as personally identifiable information (PII) or evaluate specific techniques like masking. To address this limitation, we introduce RedacBench, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating policy-conditioned redaction across domains and strategies. Constructed from 514 human-authored texts spanning individual, corporate, and government sources, paired with 187 security policies, RedacBench measures a model's ability to selectively remove policy-violating information while preserving the original semantics. We quantify performance using 8,053 annotated propositions that capture all inferable information in each text. This enables assessment of both security—the removal of sensitive propositions—and utility—the preservation of non-sensitive propositions. Experiments across multiple redaction strategies and state-of-the-art language models show that while more advanced models can improve security, preserving utility remains a challenge. To facilitate future research, we release RedacBench along with a web-based playground for dataset customization and evaluation. Available at https://hyunjunian.github.io/redaction-playground/.

Social Aspects · Trustworthy Machine Learning

Thibaud Gloaguen, Mark Vero, Robin Staab, Martin Vechev

Finetuning open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) is standard practice for achieving task-specific performance improvements. Until now, finetuning has been regarded as a controlled and secure process in which training on benign datasets leads to predictable behaviors. In this paper, we demonstrate, for the first time, that an adversary can create compromised LLMs that are performant and benign, yet exhibit adversarial behaviors once finetuned by downstream users. To this end, we propose an attack, FAB (Finetuning-activated Adversarial Behaviors), which compromises an LLM via meta-learning techniques that simulate downstream finetuning, explicitly optimizing for the emergence of adversarial behaviors in the finetuned models. At the same time, the compromised LLM is regularized to retain general capabilities and to exhibit no adversarial behaviors prior to finetuning. As a result, when users finetune (e.g., instruction-tuning, distillation, DPO) the seemingly benign model on their own datasets, they unknowingly trigger its dormant adversarial behavior. We experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of FAB across multiple LLMs and three commonly considered target behaviors: unsolicited advertising, jailbreakability, and over-refusal. We show that FAB-triggers are robust to various finetuning choices made by the user (e.g., dataset, number of steps, scheduler, post-training algorithm). Our findings challenge prevailing assumptions on the security of finetuning, revealing a critical attack vector.

Social Aspects · Trustworthy Machine Learning

Kazuki Egashira, Robin Staab, Thibaud Gloaguen, Mark Vero, Martin Vechev

Model pruning, i.e., removing a subset of model weights, has become a prominent approach to reducing the memory footprint of large language models (LLMs) during inference. Notably, popular inference engines, such as vLLM, enable users to conveniently prune downloaded models before they are deployed. While the utility and efficiency of pruning methods have improved significantly, the security implications of pruning remain underexplored. In this work, for the first time, we show that modern LLM pruning methods can be maliciously exploited. In particular, an adversary can construct a model that appears benign yet, once pruned, exhibits malicious behaviors. Our method is based on the idea that the adversary can compute a proxy metric that estimates how likely each parameter is to be pruned. With this information, the adversary can first inject a malicious behavior into those parameters that are unlikely to be pruned. Then, they can repair the model by using parameters that are \textit{likely} to be pruned, effectively canceling out the injected behavior in the unpruned model. We demonstrate the severity of our attack through extensive evaluation on five models; after any of the pruning in vLLM are applied (Magnitude, Wanda, and SparseGPT), it consistently exhibits strong malicious behaviors in a diverse set of attack scenarios (success rates of up to 95.7% for jailbreak, 98.7% for benign instruction refusal, and 99.5% for targeted content injection). Our results reveal a critical deployment-time security gap and underscore the urgent need for stronger security awareness in model compression.

Applications · Language, Speech and Dialog

Amirhossein Abaskohi, Tianyi Chen, Miguel Muñoz-Mármol, Curtis Fox, Amrutha Varshini Ramesh, Étienne Marcotte, Xing Han Lu, Nicolas Chapados, Spandana Gella, Christopher Pal 等

We introduce DRBench, a benchmark for evaluating AI agents on complex, open-ended deep research tasks in enterprise settings. Unlike prior benchmarks that focus on simple questions or web-only queries, DRBench evaluates agents on multi-step queries (for example, "What changes should we make to our product roadmap to ensure compliance with this standard?") that require identifying supporting facts from both the public web and private company knowledge base. Each task is grounded in realistic user personas and enterprise context, spanning a heterogeneous search space that includes productivity software, cloud file systems, emails, chat conversations, and the open web. Tasks are generated through a carefully designed synthesis pipeline with human-in-the-loop verification, and agents are evaluated on their ability to recall relevant insights, maintain factual accuracy, and produce coherent, well-structured reports. We release 100 deep research tasks across 10 domains, such as Sales, Cybersecurity, and Compliance. We demonstrate the effectiveness of DRBench by evaluating diverse DR agents across open- and closed-source models (such as GPT, Llama, and Qwen) and DR strategies, highlighting their strengths, weaknesses, and the critical path for advancing enterprise deep research. Code and data are available at https://github.com/ServiceNow/drbench.

Social Aspects · Fairness, Equity, Justice and Safety

Kyle O'Brien, Stephen Casper, Quentin Anthony, Tomek Korbak, Robert Kirk, Xander Davies, Ishan Mishra, Geoffrey Irving, Yarin Gal, Stella R Biderman

Open-weight AI systems offer unique benefits, including enhanced transparency, open research, and decentralized access. However, they are vulnerable to tampering attacks which can efficiently elicit harmful behaviors by modifying weights or activations. Currently, there is not yet a robust science of open-weight model risk management. Existing safety fine-tuning methods and other post-training techniques have struggled to make LLMs resistant to more than a few dozen steps of adversarial fine-tuning. In this paper, we investigate whether filtering text about dual-use topics from training data can prevent unwanted capabilities and serve as a more tamper-resistant safeguard. We introduce a multi-stage pipeline for scalable data filtering and show that it offers a tractable and effective method for minimizing biothreat proxy knowledge in LLMs. We pretrain multiple 6.9B-parameter models from scratch and find that they exhibit substantial resistance to adversarial fine-tuning attacks on up to 10,000 steps and 300M tokens of biothreat-related text — outperforming existing post-training baselines by over an order of magnitude -- with no observed degradation to unrelated capabilities. However, while filtered models lack internalized dangerous knowledge, we find that they can still leverage such information when it is provided in context (e.g., via search tool augmentation), demonstrating a need for a defense-in-depth approach. Overall, these findings help to establish pretraining data curation as a promising layer of defense for open-weight AI systems

Shawn Li, Peilin Cai, Yuxiao Zhou, Zhiyu Ni, Renjie Liang, You Qin, Yi Nian, Zhengzhong Tu, Xiyang Hu, Yue Zhao

Out-of-Distribution (OOD) detection is critical for ensuring the reliability of machine learning models in safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving and medical diagnosis. While deploying personalized OOD detection directly on edge devices is desirable, it remains challenging due to large model sizes and the computational infeasibility of on-device training. Federated learning partially addresses this but still requires gradient computation and backpropagation, exceeding the capabilities of many edge devices.To overcome these challenges, we propose SecDOOD, a secure cloud-device collaboration framework for efficient on-device OOD detection without requiring device-side backpropagation.SecDOOD utilizes cloud resources for model training while ensuring user data privacy by retaining sensitive information on-device. Central to SecDOOD is a HyperNetwork-based personalized parameter generation module, which adapts cloud-trained models to device-specific distributions by dynamically generating local weight adjustments, effectively combining central and local information without local fine-tuning. Additionally, our dynamic feature sampling and encryption strategy selectively encrypts only the most informative feature channels, largely reducing encryption overhead without compromising detection performance.Extensive experiments across multiple datasets and OOD scenarios demonstrate that SecDOOD achieves performance comparable to fully fine-tuned models, enabling secure, efficient, and personalized OOD detection on resource-limited edge devices. To enhance accessibility and reproducibility, our code is publicly available at https://github.com/Dystopians/SecDOOD.

Jiale Zhao, Xinyang Jiang, Junyao Gao, Yuhao Xue, Cairong Zhao

Unified vision-language models (VLMs) have recently shown remarkable progress, enabling a single model to flexibly address diverse tasks through different instructions within a shared computational architecture. This instruction-based control mechanism creates unique security challenges, as adversarial inputs must remain effective across multiple task instructions that may be unpredictably applied to process the same malicious content. In this paper, we introduce CrossVLAD, a new benchmark dataset carefully curated from MSCOCO with GPT-4-assisted annotations for systematically evaluating cross-task adversarial attacks on unified VLMs. CrossVLAD centers on the object-change objective--consistently manipulating a target object's classification across four downstream tasks--and proposes a novel success rate metric that measures simultaneous misclassification across all tasks, providing a rigorous evaluation of adversarial transferability. To tackle this challenge, we present CRAFT (Cross-task Region-based Attack Framework with Token-alignment), an efficient region-centric attack method. Extensive experiments on Florence-2 and other popular unified VLMs demonstrate that our method outperforms existing approaches in both overall cross-task attack performance and targeted object-change success rates, highlighting its effectiveness in adversarially influencing unified VLMs across diverse tasks.

Qian Feng, JiaHang Tu, Mintong Kang, Hanbin Zhao, Chao Zhang, Hui Qian

Incremental unlearning (IU) is critical for pre-trained models to comply with sequential data deletion requests, yet existing methods primarily suppress parameters or confuse knowledge without explicit constraints on both feature and gradient level, resulting in superficial forgetting where residual information remains recoverable. This incomplete forgetting risks security breaches and disrupts retention balance, especially in IU scenarios. We propose FG-OrIU (Feature-Gradient Orthogonality for Incremental Unlearning), the first framework unifying orthogonal constraints on both features and gradients level to achieve deep forgetting, where the forgetting effect is irreversible. FG-OrIU decomposes feature spaces via Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), separating forgetting and remaining class features into distinct subspaces. It then enforces dual constraints: feature orthogonal projection on both forgetting and remaining classes, while gradient orthogonal projection prevents the reintroduction of forgotten knowledge and disruption to remaining classes during updates. Additionally, dynamic subspace adaptation merges newly forgetting subspaces and contracts remaining subspaces, ensuring a stable balance between removal and retention across sequential unlearning tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

Yunqi Liu, Xue Ouyang, Xiaohui Cui

Vision-language pre-training (VLP) models leverage large-scale cross-modal pre-training to align vision and text modalities, achieving impressive performance on tasks like image-text retrieval and visual grounding. However, these models are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, raising critical concerns about their robustness and reliability in safety-critical applications. Existing black-box attack methods are limited by insufficient data augmentation mechanisms or the disruption of global semantic structures, leading to poor adversarial transferability. To address these challenges, we propose the Global-Local Enhanced Adversarial Multimodal attack (GLEAM), a unified framework for generating transferable adversarial examples in vision-language tasks. GLEAM introduces a local feature enhancement module that achieves diverse local deformations while maintaining global semantic and geometric integrity. It also incorporates a global distribution expansion module, which expands feature space coverage through dynamic transformations. Additionally, a cross-modal feature alignment module leverages intermediate adversarial states to guide text perturbations. This enhances cross-modal consistency and adversarial text transferability. Extensive experiments on Flickr30K and MSCOCO datasets show that GLEAM outperforms state-of-the-art methods, with over 10%-30% higher attack success rates in image-text retrieval tasks and over 30% improved transferability on large models like Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o. GLEAM provides a robust tool for exposing vulnerabilities in VLP models and offers valuable insights into designing more secure and reliable vision-language systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/LuckAlex/GLEAM.

Pablo Garcia-Fernandez, Lorenzo Vaquero, Mingxuan Liu, Feng Xue, Daniel Cores, Nicu Sebe, Manuel Mucientes, Elisa Ricci

Open-vocabulary object detection (OvOD) is set to revolutionize security screening by enabling systems to recognize any item in X-ray scans. However, developing effective OvOD models for X-ray imaging presents unique challenges due to data scarcity and the modality gap that prevents direct adoption of RGB-based solutions. To overcome these limitations, we propose RAXO, a training-free framework that repurposes off-the-shelf RGB OvOD detectors for robust X-ray detection. RAXO builds high-quality X-ray class descriptors using a dual-source retrieval strategy. It gathers relevant RGB images from the web and enriches them via a novel X-ray material transfer mechanism, eliminating the need for labeled databases. These visual descriptors replace text-based classification in OvOD, leveraging intra-modal feature distances for robust detection. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RAXO consistently improves OvOD performance, providing an average mAP increase of up to 17.0 points over base detectors. To further support research in this emerging field, we also introduce DET-COMPASS, a new benchmark featuring bounding box annotations for over 300 object categories, enabling large-scale evaluation of OvOD in X-ray. Code and dataset available at: https://pagf188.github.io/RAXO/.

Xu Chen, Yang Li, Yahong Han, Guangquan Xu, Jialie Shen

Data-Free Knowledge Distillation (DFKD) avoids accessing the original training data during knowledge transferring from a large model to a smaller one, possessing significant potential in ensuring the widespread promotion of industry-level applications while safeguarding user privacy and data security. Unfortunately, due to the lack of precise estimation of the original data distribution, existing DFKD methods often rely on manually induced priors to constrain the generator to produce samples that comply with the rules as much as possible. In this paper, we propose a novel method dubbed CouPling Network (CPNet) that constructs a generator to explicitly approximate the inverse transformation of the teacher model. Consequently, the two components can be integrated into an autoencoder specifically tailored for label information, where the generated images are treated as latent variables. Since real labels are typically uniformly distributed and the parameters of the teacher model are fixed, this enables our generator to produce images that closely approximate the true distribution. Besides, we transform real labels into feature-level constraints through the inverse transformation of a network classifier with fixed parameters, thereby converting the classification problem of generated images into an issue of distance measurement between features. We utilize this constraint for adversarial training and enhancing the diversity of produced images. Extensive experiments on three public benchmarks demonstrate that our proposed method achieves superior or competitive performance compared to previous state-of-the-art methods, while also exhibiting faster generation speed.

Hyun Jun Yook, Ga San Jhun, Jae Hyun Cho, Min Jeon, Donghyun Kim, Tae Hyung Kim, Youn Kyu Lee

Machine unlearning (MU) removes specific data points or concepts from deep learning models to enhance privacy and prevent sensitive content generation. Adversarial prompts can exploit unlearned models to generate content containing removed concepts, posing a significant security risk. However, existing adversarial attack methods still face challenges in generating content that aligns with an attacker's intent while incurring high computational costs to identify successful prompts. To address these challenges, we propose ZIUM, a Zero-shot Intent-aware adversarial attack on Unlearned Models, which enables the flexible customization of target attack images to reflect an attacker's intent. Additionally, ZIUM supports zero-shot adversarial attacks without requiring further optimization for previously attacked unlearned concepts. The evaluation across various MU scenarios demonstrated ZIUM's effectiveness in successfully customizing content based on user-intent prompts while achieving a superior attack success rate compared to existing methods. Moreover, its zero-shot adversarial attack significantly reduces the attack time for previously attacked unlearned concepts.

Taowen Wang, Cheng Han, James Liang, Wenhao Yang, Dongfang Liu, Luna Xinyu Zhang, Qifan Wang, Jiebo Luo, Ruixiang Tang

Recently in robotics, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have emerged as a transformative approach, enabling robots to execute complex tasks by integrating visual and linguistic inputs within an end-to-end learning framework. Despite their significant capabilities, VLA models introduce new attack surfaces. This paper systematically evaluates their robustness. Recognizing the unique demands of robotic execution, our attack objectives target the inherent spatial and functional characteristics of robotic systems. In particular, we introduce two untargeted attack objectives that leverage spatial foundations to destabilize robotic actions, and a targeted attack objective that manipulates the robotic trajectory. Additionally, we design an adversarial patch generation approach that places a small, colorful patch within the camera's view, effectively executing the attack in both digital and physical environments. Our evaluation reveals a marked degradation in task success rates, with up to a 100% reduction across a suite of simulated robotic tasks, highlighting critical security gaps in current VLA architectures. By unveiling these vulnerabilities and proposing actionable evaluation metrics, we advance both the understanding and enhancement of safety for VLA-based robotic systems, underscoring the necessity for continuously developing robust defense strategies prior to physical-world deployments.

Chang Liu, Yunfan Ye, Fan Zhang, Qingyang Zhou, Yuchuan Luo, Zhiping Cai

Numerous synthesized videos from generative models, especially human-centric ones that simulate realistic human actions, pose significant threats to human information security and authenticity. While progress has been made in binary forgery video detection, the lack of fine-grained understanding of forgery types raises concerns regarding both reliability and interpretability, which are critical for real-world applications. To address this limitation, we propose HumanSAM, a new framework that builds upon the fundamental challenges of video generation models. Specifically, HumanSAM aims to classify human-centric forgeries into three distinct types of artifacts commonly observed in generated content: spatial, appearance, and motion anomaly.To better capture the features of geometry, semantics and spatiotemporal consistency, we propose to generate the human forgery representation by fusing two branches of video understanding and spatial depth. We also adopt a rank-based confidence enhancement strategy during the training process to learn more robust representation by introducing three prior scores. For training and evaluation, we construct the first public benchmark, the Human-centric Forgery Video (HFV) dataset, with all types of forgeries carefully annotated semi-automatically. In our experiments, HumanSAM yields promising results in comparison with state-of-the-art methods, both in binary and multi-class forgery classification.

Yeming Yang, Qingling Zhu, Jianping Luo, Ka-Chun Wong, Qiuzhen Lin, Jianqiang Li

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been successfully applied in various computer tasks. However, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which could lead to severe security risks. In recent years, robust neural architecture search (NAS) has gradually become an emerging direction for designing adversarially robust architectures. However, existing robust NAS methods rely on repeatedly training numerous DNNs to evaluate robustness, which makes the search process extremely expensive. In this paper, we propose a training-free robust NAS method (TRNAS) that significantly reduces search costs. First, we design a zero-cost proxy model (R-Score) that formalizes adversarial robustness evaluation by exploring the theory of DNN's linear activation capability and feature consistency. This proxy only requires initialized weights for evaluation, thereby avoiding expensive adversarial training costs. Secondly, we introduce a multi-objective selection (MOS) strategy to save candidate architectures with robustness and compactness. Experimental results show that TRNAS only requires 0.02 GPU days to find a promising robust architecture in a vast search space including approximately 10^ 20 networks. TRNAS surpasses other state-of-the-art robust NAS methods under both white-box and black-box attacks. Finally, we summarize a few meaningful conclusions for designing the robust architecture and promoting the development of robust NAS field.

Zhaoyang Li, Zhu Teng, Baopeng Zhang, Jianping Fan

Deepfake detection methods are becoming increasingly crucial for identity security and have recently been employed to support legal proceedings. However, these methods often exhibit unfairness due to flawed logical reasoning, undermining the reliability of their predictions and raising concerns about their applicability in legal contexts. To mitigate this bias, existing approaches typically rely on predefined demographic attributes, such as race and gender. However, these assumptions are inherently limited, as different deepfake detectors exhibit substantial variations in fairness performance, often uncovering intricate and unforeseen bias patterns. To this end, we propose the Adversarial Open-Unfairness Discovery and Mitigation Network (AdvOU), a novel framework designed to mitigate unpredictable unfairness in deepfake detection. Our approach strengthens general deepfake detectors by equipping them with a lightweight Unfairness Regulator (UR), which dynamically identifies and mitigates bias. Furthermore, we propose an adversarial learning paradigm that alternates between the training of the Open-Unfairness Discovery (OUD) module and the Unfairness Adversarial Mitigation (UAM) module. The former intensifies unfairness within UR to reveal underlying bias patterns, while the latter leverages fairness in the detector by enforcing adversarial robustness against unfairness. Extensive experiments on widely used deepfake datasets validate the effectiveness of our approach, outperforming state-of-the-art methods in both fairness and generalization evaluations for cross-domain deepfake detection. The code is available at https://github.com/liacaaa/AdvOU.

Changhao Li, Xinrui Chen, Ji Wang, Kang Zhao, Jianfei Chen

Quantization is a key technique to reduce network size and computational complexity by representing the network parameters with a lower precision. Traditional quantization methods rely on access to original training data, which is often restricted due to privacy concerns or security challenges. Zero-shot Quantization (ZSQ) addresses this by using synthetic data generated from pre-trained models, eliminating the need for real training data.Recently, ZSQ has been extended to object detection. However, existing methods use unlabeled task-agnostic synthetic images that lack the specific information required for object detection, leading to suboptimal performance. In this paper, we propose a novel task-specific ZSQ framework for object detection networks, which consists of two main stages. First, we introduce a bounding box and category sampling strategy to synthesize a task-specific calibration set from the pre-trained network, reconstructing object locations, sizes, and category distributions without any prior knowledge. Second, we integrate task-specific training into the knowledge distillation process to restore the performance of quantized detection networks.Extensive experiments conducted on the MS-COCO and Pascal VOC datasets demonstrate the efficiency and state-of-the-art performance of our method.