The rapid deployment of autonomous AI agents creates urgent challenges in the areas of authorization, accountability, and access control in task delegation. This position paper argues that authenticated and auditable delegation of authority to AI agents is a critical component of mitigating practical risks and unlocking the value of agents. To support this argument, we examine how existing web authentication and authorization protocols, as well as natural language interfaces to common access control mechanisms, can be extended to enable secure authenticated delegation of authority to AI agents. By extending OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect with agent-specific credentials and using transparent translation of natural language permissions into robust scoping rules across diverse interaction modalities, we outline how authenticated delegation can be achieved to enable clear chains of accountability while maintaining compatibility with established authentication and web infrastructure for immediate compatibility. This work contributes to ensuring that agentic AI systems perform only appropriate actions. It argues for prioritizing delegation infrastructure as a key component of AI agent governance and provides a roadmap for achieving this.
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Applications
Realizing the vision of using AI agents to automate critical IT tasks depends on the ability to measure and understand effectiveness of proposed solutions. We introduce ITBench, a framework that offers a systematic methodology for benchmarking AI agents to address real-world IT automation tasks. Our initial release targets three key areas: Site Reliability Engineering (SRE), Compliance and Security Operations (CISO), and Financial Operations (FinOps). The design enables AI researchers to understand the challenges and opportunities of AI agents for IT automation with push-button workflows and interpretable metrics. IT-Bench includes an initial set of 102 real-world scenarios, which can be easily extended by community contributions. Our results show that agents powered by state-of-the-art models resolve only 11.4% of SRE scenarios, 25.2% of CISO scenarios, and 25.8% of FinOps scenarios (excluding anomaly detection). For FinOps-specific anomaly detection (AD) scenarios, AI agents achieve an F1 score of 0.35. We expect ITBench to be a key enabler of AI-driven IT automation that is correct, safe, and fast. IT-Bench, along with a leaderboard and sample agent implementations, is available at https://github.com/ibm/itbench.
Social Aspects · Safety
Prompting has become a dominant paradigm for adapting large language models (LLMs).While discrete (textual) prompts are widely used for their interpretability, soft (parameter) prompts have recently gained traction in APIs. This is because they can encode information from more training samples while minimizing the user's token usage, leaving more space in the context window for task-specific input. However, soft prompts are tightly coupled to the LLM they are tuned on, limiting their generalization to other LLMs. This constraint is particularly problematic for *efficiency* and *privacy*: (1) tuning prompts on each LLM incurs high computational costs, especially as LLMs continue to grow in size. Additionally, (2) when the LLM is hosted externally, soft prompt tuning often requires sharing private data with the LLM provider. For instance, this is the case with the NVIDIA NeMo API.To address these issues, we propose POST (**P**rivacy **O**f **S**oft prompt **T**ransfer), a framework that enables private tuning of soft prompts on a small model and subsequently transfers these prompts to a larger LLM.POST uses knowledge distillation to derive a small model directly from the large LLM to improve prompt transferability, tunes the soft prompt locally, optionally with differential privacy guarantees, and transfers it back to the larger LLM using a small public dataset. Our experiments show that POST reduces computational costs, preserves privacy, and effectively transfers high-utility soft prompts.
Applications · Computer Vision
As AI generative models evolve, face swap technology has become increasingly accessible, raising concerns over potential misuse. Celebrities may be manipulated without consent, and ordinary individuals may fall victim to identity fraud. To address these threats, we propose Secure Swap, a method that protects persons of interest (POI) from face-swapping abuse and embeds a unique, invisible watermark into nonPOI swapped images for traceability. By introducing an ID Passport layer, Secure Swap redacts POI faces and generates watermarked outputs for nonPOI. A detachable watermark encoder and decoder are trained with the model to ensure provenance tracing. Experimental results demonstrate that Secure Swap not only preserves face swap functionality but also effectively prevents unauthorized swaps of POI and detects different embedded model's watermarks with high accuracy. Specifically, our method achieves a 100% success rate in protecting POI and over 99% watermark extraction accuracy for nonPOI. Besides fidelity and effectiveness, the robustness of protected models against image-level and model-level attacks in both online and offline application scenarios is also experimentally demonstrated.
Deep Learning · Robustness
Despite the remarkable success of large foundation models across a range of tasks, they remain susceptible to security threats such as backdoor attacks. By injecting poisoned data containing specific triggers during training, adversaries can manipulate model predictions in a targeted manner. While prior work has focused on empirically designing and evaluating such attacks, a rigorous theoretical understanding of when and why they succeed is lacking. In this work, we analyze backdoor attacks that exploit the token selection process within attention mechanisms--a core component of transformer-based architectures. We show that single-head self-attention transformers trained via gradient descent can interpolate poisoned training data. Moreover, we prove that when the backdoor triggers are sufficiently strong but not overly dominant, attackers can successfully manipulate model predictions. Our analysis characterizes how adversaries manipulate token selection to alter outputs and identifies the theoretical conditions under which these attacks succeed. We validate our findings through experiments on synthetic datasets.
Applications · Everything Else
Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly capable of autonomously conducting cyberattacks, posing significant threats to existing applications. This growing risk highlights the urgent need for a real-world benchmark to evaluate the ability of LLM agents to exploit web application vulnerabilities. However, existing benchmarks fall short as they are limited to abstracted Capture-the-Flag competitions or lack comprehensive coverage. Building a benchmark for real-world vulnerabilities involves both specialized exper-tise to reproduce exploits and a systematic approach to evaluating unpredictable attacks. To address this challenge, we introduce CVE-Bench, a real-world cybersecurity benchmark based on critical-severity Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. In CVE-Bench, we design a sandbox framework that enables LLM agents to exploit vulnerable web applications in scenarios that mimic real-world conditions, while also providing effective evaluation of their exploits. Our experiments show that the state-of-the-art agent framework can exploit up to 13% of the vulnerabilities.
Social Aspects · Security
Despite the remarkable performance of Large Language Models (\textbf{LLMs}), they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which can compromise their safety mechanisms. Existing studies often rely on brute-force optimization or manual design, failing to uncover potential risks in real-world scenarios. To address this, we propose a novel jailbreak attack framework, \textbf{ICRT}, inspired by heuristics and biases in human cognition. Leveraging the \textit{simplicity effect}, we employ \textit{cognitive decomposition} to reduce the complexity of malicious prompts. Simultaneously, \textit{relevance bias} is utilized to reorganize prompts, enhancing semantic alignment and inducing harmful outputs effectively. Furthermore, we introduce a ranking-based harmfulness evaluation metric that surpasses the traditional binary success-or-failure paradigm by employing ranking aggregation methods such as Elo, HodgeRank, and Rank Centrality to comprehensively quantify the harmfulness of generated content. Experimental results show that our approach consistently bypasses mainstream \textbf{LLMs}' safety mechanisms and generates high-risk content.
Social Aspects · Security
The diffusion-based adversarial purification methods attempt to drown adversarial perturbations into a part of isotropic noise through the forward process, and then recover the clean images through the reverse process. Due to the lack of distribution information about adversarial perturbations in the pixel domain, it is often unavoidable to damage normal semantics. We turn to the frequency domain perspective, decomposing the image into amplitude spectrum and phase spectrum. We find that for both spectra, the damage caused by adversarial perturbations tends to increase monotonically with frequency. This means that we can extract the content and structural information of the original clean sample from the frequency components that are less damaged. Meanwhile, theoretical analysis indicates that existing purification methods indiscriminately damage all frequency components, leading to excessive damage to the image. Therefore, we propose a purification method that can eliminate adversarial perturbations while maximizing the preservation of the content and structure of the original image. Specifically, at each time step during the reverse process, for the amplitude spectrum, we replace the low-frequency components of the estimated image's amplitude spectrum with the corresponding parts of the adversarial image.For the phase spectrum, we project the phase of the estimated image into a designated range of the adversarial image's phase spectrum, focusing on the low frequencies. Empirical evidence from extensive experiments demonstrates that our method significantly outperforms most current defense methods.
General Machine Learning · Online Learning, Active Learning and Bandits
Online safe reinforcement learning (RL) plays a key role in dynamic environments, with applications in autonomous driving, robotics, and cybersecurity. The objective is to learn optimal policies that maximize rewards while satisfying safety constraints modeled by constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs). Existing methods achieve sublinear regret under stochastic constraints but often fail in adversarial settings, where constraints are unknown, time-varying, and potentially adversarially designed. In this paper, we propose the Optimistic Mirror Descent Primal-Dual (OMDPD) algorithm, the first to address online CMDPs with anytime adversarial constraints. OMDPD achieves optimal regret $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{K})$ and strong constraint violation $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{K})$ without relying on Slater’s condition or the existence of a strictly known safe policy. We further show that access to accurate estimates of rewards and transitions can further improve these bounds. Our results offer practical guarantees for safe decision-making in adversarial environments.
Theory · Learning Theory
Machine unlearning addresses the problem of updating a machine learning model/system trained on a dataset $S$ so that the influence of a set of deletion requests $U \subseteq S$ on the unlearned model is minimized. The gold standard definition of unlearning demands that the updated model, after deletion, be nearly identical to the model obtained by retraining. This definition is designed for a worst-case attacker (one who can recover not only the unlearned model but also the remaining data samples, i.e., $S \setminus U$). Such a stringent definition has made developing efficient unlearning algorithms challenging. However, such strong attackers are also unrealistic. In this work, we propose a new definition, *system-aware unlearning*, which aims to provide unlearning guarantees against an attacker that can at best only gain access to the data stored in the system for learning/unlearning requests and not all of $S\setminus U$. With this new definition, we use the simple intuition that if a system can store less to make its learning/unlearning updates, it can be more secure and update more efficiently against a system-aware attacker. Towards that end, we present an exact system-aware unlearning algorithm for linear classification using a selective sampling-based approach, and we generalize the method for classification with general function classes. We theoretically analyze the tradeoffs between deletion capacity, accuracy, memory, and computation time.
Social Aspects · Privacy
Secure Aggregation (SA) is a cornerstone of Federated Learning (FL), ensuring that user updates remain hidden from servers. The advanced Flamingo (S\&P'23) has realized multi-round aggregation and improved efficiency. However, it still faces several key challenges: scalability issues with dynamic user participation, a lack of verifiability for server-side aggregation results, and vulnerability to Model Inconsistency Attacks (MIA) caused by a malicious server distributing inconsistent models. To address these issues, we propose $\textit{Janus}$, a generic SA scheme based on dual-server architecture. Janus ensures security against up to $n-2$ colluding clients (where $n$ is the total client count), which prevents privacy breaches for non-colluders. Additionally, Janus is model-independent, ensuring applicability across any FL model without specific adaptations. Furthermore, Janus introduces a new cryptographic primitive, Separable Homomorphic Commitment, which enables clients to efficiently verify the correctness of aggregation. Finally, extensive experiments show that Janus not only significantly enhances security but also reduces per-client communication and computation overhead from logarithmic to constant scale, with a tolerable impact on model performance.
Social Aspects · Security
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious behaviors are implanted during training. While existing defenses can effectively purify compromised models, they typically require labeled data or specific training procedures, making them difficult to apply beyond supervised learning settings. Notably, recent studies have shown successful backdoor attacks across various learning paradigms, highlighting a critical security concern. To address this gap, we propose Two-stage Symmetry Connectivity (TSC), a novel backdoor purification defense that operates independently of data format and requires only a small fraction of clean samples. Through theoretical analysis, we prove that by leveraging permutation invariance in neural networks and quadratic mode connectivity, TSC amplifies the loss on poisoned samples while maintaining bounded clean accuracy. Experiments demonstrate that TSC achieves robust performance comparable to state-of-the-art methods in supervised learning scenarios. Furthermore, TSC generalizes to self-supervised learning frameworks, such as SimCLR and CLIP, maintaining its strong defense capabilities. Our code is available at https://github.com/JiePeng104/TSC.
Deep Learning · Robustness
Despite their advances and success, real-world deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Universal adversarial perturbation, an input-agnostic attack, poses a serious threat for them to be deployed in security-sensitive systems. In this case, a single universal adversarial perturbation deceives the model on a range of clean inputs without requiring input-specific optimization, which makes it particularly threatening. In this work, we observe that universal adversarial perturbations usually lead to abnormal entropy spectrum in hidden layers, which suggests that the prediction is dominated by a small number of ``feature'' in such cases (rather than democratically by many features). Inspired by this, we propose an efficient yet effective defense method for mitigating UAPs called \emph{Democratic Training} by performing entropy-based model enhancement to suppress the effect of the universal adversarial perturbations in a given model. \emph{Democratic Training} is evaluated with 7 neural networks trained on 5 benchmark datasets and 5 types of state-of-the-art universal adversarial attack methods. The results show that it effectively reduces the attack success rate, improves model robustness and preserves the model accuracy on clean samples.
Vulnerability of Frontier language models to misuse has prompted the development of safety measures like filters and alignment training seeking to ensure safety through robustness to adversarially crafted prompts. We assert that robustness is fundamentally insufficient for ensuring safety goals due to inferential threats from dual-intent queries, with current defenses and evaluations failing to account for these risks. To quantify these risks, we introduce a new safety evaluation framework based on $\textit{impermissible information leakage}$ of model outputs and demonstrate how our proposed question-decomposition attack can extract dangerous knowledge from a censored LLM more effectively than traditional jailbreaking. Underlying our proposed evaluation method is a novel information-theoretic threat model of $\textit{inferential adversaries}$, distinguished from $\textit{security adversaries}$, such as jailbreaks, in that success involves inferring impermissible knowledge from victim outputs as opposed to forcing explicitly impermissible victim outputs. Through our information-theoretic framework, we show that ensuring safety against inferential adversaries requires defenses which bound impermissible information leakage, and, such defenses inevitably incur safety-utility trade-offs.
Applications · Robotics
Perception is a crucial component of autonomous driving systems. However, single-agent setups often face limitations due to sensor constraints, especially under challenging conditions like severe occlusion, adverse weather, and long-range object detection. Multi-agent collaborative perception (CP) offers a promising solution that enables communication and information sharing between connected vehicles. Yet, the heterogeneity among agents—in terms of sensors, models, and tasks—significantly hinders effective and efficient cross-agent collaboration. To address these challenges, we propose STAMP, a scalable task- and model-agnostic collaborative perception framework tailored for heterogeneous agents. STAMP utilizes lightweight adapter-reverter pairs to transform Bird's Eye View (BEV) features between agent-specific domains and a shared protocol domain, facilitating efficient feature sharing and fusion while minimizing computational overhead. Moreover, our approach enhances scalability, preserves model security, and accommodates a diverse range of agents. Extensive experiments on both simulated (OPV2V) and real-world (V2V4Real) datasets demonstrate that STAMP achieves comparable or superior accuracy to state-of-the-art models with significantly reduced computational costs. As the first-of-its-kind task- and model-agnostic collaborative perception framework, STAMP aims to advance research in scalable and secure mobility systems, bringing us closer to Level 5 autonomy. Our project page is at https://xiangbogaobarry.github.io/STAMP and the code is available at https://github.com/taco-group/STAMP.
Social Aspects · Trustworthy Machine Learning
Embodied AI represents systems where AI is integrated into physical entities. Multimodal Large Language Model (LLM), which exhibits powerful language understanding abilities, has been extensively employed in embodied AI by facilitating sophisticated task planning. However, a critical safety issue remains overlooked: could these embodied LLMs perpetrate harmful behaviors? In response, we introduce BadRobot, the first attack paradigm designed to jailbreak robotic manipulation, making embodied LLMs violate safety and ethical constraints through typical voice-based user-system interactions. Specifically, three vulnerabilities are exploited to achieve this type of attack: (i) manipulation of LLMs within robotic systems, (ii) misalignment between linguistic outputs and physical actions, and (iii) unintentional hazardous behaviors caused by world knowledge's flaws. Furthermore, we construct a benchmark of various malicious physical action queries to evaluate BadRobot's attack performance. Based on this benchmark, extensive experiments against existing prominent embodied LLM frameworks (e.g., Voxposer, Code as Policies, and ProgPrompt) demonstrate the effectiveness of our BadRobot. We emphasize that addressing this emerging vulnerability is crucial for the secure deployment of LLMs in robotics.Warning: This paper contains harmful AI-generated language and aggressive actions.
Deep Learning · Large Language Models
Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant promise in real-world decision-making tasks for embodied artificial intelligence, especially when fine-tuned to leverage their inherent common sense and reasoning abilities while being tailored to specific applications. However, this fine-tuning process introduces considerable safety and security vulnerabilities, especially in safety-critical cyber-physical systems. In this work, we propose the first comprehensive framework for **B**ackdoor **A**ttacks against **L**LM-based **D**ecision-making systems (BALD) in embodied AI, systematically exploring the attack surfaces and trigger mechanisms. Specifically, we propose three distinct attack mechanisms: *word injection*, *scenario manipulation*, and *knowledge injection*, targeting various components in the LLM-based decision-making pipeline. We perform extensive experiments on representative LLMs (GPT-3.5, LLaMA2, PaLM2) in autonomous driving and home robot tasks, demonstrating the effectiveness and stealthiness of our backdoor triggers across various attack channels, with cases like vehicles accelerating toward obstacles and robots placing knives on beds. Our word and knowledge injection attacks achieve nearly 100\% success rate across multiple models and datasets while requiring only limited access to the system. Our scenario manipulation attack yields success rates exceeding 65\%, reaching up to 90\%, and does not require any runtime system intrusion. We also assess the robustness of these attacks against defenses, revealing their resilience. Our findings highlight critical security vulnerabilities in embodied LLM systems and emphasize the urgent need for safeguarding these systems to mitigate potential risks.
Social Aspects · Fairness, Equity, Justice and Safety
Conformal prediction is a statistically rigorous method for quantifying uncertainty in models by having them output sets of predictions, with larger sets indicating more uncertainty. However, prediction sets are not inherently actionable; many applications require a single output to act on, not several. To overcome this limitation, prediction sets can be provided to a human who then makes an informed decision. In any such system it is crucial to ensure the fairness of outcomes across protected groups, and researchers have proposed that Equalized Coverage be used as the standard for fairness. By conducting experiments with human participants, we demonstrate that providing prediction sets can lead to disparate impact in decisions. Disquietingly, we find that providing sets that satisfy Equalized Coverage actually increases disparate impact compared to marginal coverage. Instead of equalizing coverage, we propose to equalize set sizes across groups which empirically leads to lower disparate impact.
Social Aspects · Trustworthy Machine Learning
3D Gaussian splatting (3DGS), known for its groundbreaking performance and efficiency, has become a dominant 3D representation and brought progress to many 3D vision tasks. However, in this work, we reveal a significant security vulnerability that has been largely overlooked in 3DGS: the computation cost of training 3DGS could be maliciously tampered by poisoning the input data. By developing an attack named Poison-splat, we reveal a novel attack surface where the adversary can poison the input images to drastically increase the computation memory and time needed for 3DGS training, pushing the algorithm towards its worst computation complexity. In extreme cases, the attack can even consume all allocable memory, leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) that disrupts servers, resulting in practical damages to real-world 3DGS service vendors. Such a computation cost attack is achieved by addressing a bi-level optimization problem through three tailored strategies: attack objective approximation, proxy model rendering, and optional constrained optimization. These strategies not only ensure the effectiveness of our attack but also make it difficult to defend with simple defensive measures. We hope the revelation of this novel attack surface can spark attention to this crucial yet overlooked vulnerability of 3DGS systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/jiahaolu97/poison-splat .
Deep Learning · Graph Neural Networks
The paradigm of ``pre-training and prompt-tuning", with its effectiveness and lightweight characteristics, has rapidly spread from the language field to the graph field. Several pioneering studies have designed specialized prompt functions for diverse downstream graph tasks based on various graph pre-training strategies. These prompts concentrate on the compatibility between the pre-training pretext and downstream graph tasks, aiming to bridge the gap between them. However, designing prompts to blindly adapt to downstream tasks based on this concept neglects crucial security issues. By conducting covert attacks on downstream graph data, we find that even when the downstream task data closely matches that of the pre-training tasks, it is still feasible to generate highly misleading prompts using simple deceptive techniques. In this paper, we shift the primary focus of graph prompts from compatibility to vulnerability issues in adversarial attack scenarios. We design a highly extensible shield defense system for the prompts, which enhances their robustness from two perspectives: \textbf{\textit{Direct Handling}} and \textbf{\textit{Indirect Amplification}}. When downstream graph data exhibits unreliable biases, the former directly combats invalid information by adding hybrid multi-defense prompts to the input graph's feature space, while the latter employs a training strategy that circumvents invalid part and amplifies valid part. We provide a theoretical derivation that proves their feasibility, indicating that unbiased prompts exist under certain conditions on unreliable data. Extensive experiments across various scenarios of adversarial attack (including adaptive and non-adaptive attacks) indicate that the prompts within our shield defense system exhibit enhanced resilience and superiority. Our work explores new perspectives in the field of graph prompts, offering a novel option for downstream robust prompt tuning.