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Reinforcement Learning · Multi-agent

Runyu Lu, Peng Zhang, Ruochuan Shi, Yuanheng Zhu, Dongbin Zhao, Yang Liu, Dong Wang, Cesare Alippi

Equilibrium learning in adversarial games is an important topic widely examined in the fields of game theory and reinforcement learning (RL). Pursuit-evasion game (PEG), as an important class of real-world games from the fields of robotics and security, requires exponential time to be accurately solved. When the underlying graph structure varies, even the state-of-the-art RL methods require recomputation or at least fine-tuning, which can be time-consuming and impair real-time applicability. This paper proposes an Equilibrium Policy Generalization (EPG) framework to effectively learn a generalized policy with robust cross-graph zero-shot performance. In the context of PEGs, our framework is generally applicable to both pursuer and evader sides in both no-exit and multi-exit scenarios. These two generalizability properties, to our knowledge, are the first to appear in this domain. The core idea of the EPG framework is to train an RL policy across different graph structures against the equilibrium policy for each single graph. To construct an equilibrium oracle for single-graph policies, we present a dynamic programming (DP) algorithm that provably generates pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with near-optimal time complexity. To guarantee scalability with respect to pursuer number, we further extend DP and RL by designing a grouping mechanism and a sequence model for joint policy decomposition, respectively. Experimental results show that, using equilibrium guidance and a distance feature proposed for cross-graph PEG training, the EPG framework guarantees desirable zero-shot performance in various unseen real-world graphs. Besides, when trained under an equilibrium heuristic proposed for the graphs with exits, our generalized pursuer policy can even match the performance of the fine-tuned policies from the state-of-the-art PEG methods.

Theory · Game Theory

Alistair Benford, Per Kristian Lehre

Most methods for finding a Nash equilibrium rely on procedures that operate over the entire action space, making them infeasible for settings with too many actions to be searched exhaustively. Randomised search heuristics such as coevolutionary algorithms offer benefits in such settings, however they lack many of the theoretical guarantees established for exhaustive methods such as zero-regret learning. We address this by developing a method for proving necessary and sufficient conditions for a coevolutionary algorithm to be stable, in the sense that it reliably retains a Nash equilibrium following discovery. As the method provides bounds that are adapted to both application and algorithm instance, it can be used as a practical tool for parameter configuration. We additionally show how bounds on regret may be deduced from our results and undertake corresponding empirical analysis.

Theory · Everything Else

Raphael Boige, Amine Boumaza, Bruno Scherrer

Deterministic game-solving algorithms are conventionally analyzed in the light of their average-case complexity against a distribution of random game-trees, where leaf values are independently sampled from a fixed distribution. This simplified model enables uncluttered mathematical analysis, revealing two key properties: root value distributions asymptotically collapse to a single fixed value for finite-valued trees, and all reasonable algorithms achieve global optimality. However, these findings are artifacts of the model’s design: its long criticized independence assumption strips games of structural complexity, producing trivial instances where no algorithm faces meaningful challenges. To address this limitation, we introduce a simple probabilistic model that incrementally constructs game-trees using a fixed level-wise conditional distribution. By enforcing ancestor dependencies, a critical structural feature of real-world games, our framework generates problems with adjustable difficulty while retaining some form of analytical tractability. For several algorithms, including AlphaBeta and Scout, we derive recursive formulas characterizing their average-case complexities under this model. These allow us to rigorously compare algorithms on deep game-trees, where Monte-Carlo simulations are no longer feasible. While asymptotically, all algorithms seem to converge to identical branching factor (a result analogous to that of independence-based models), deep finite trees reveal stark differences: AlphaBeta incurs a significantly larger constant multiplicative factor compared to algorithms like Scout, leading to a substantial practical slowdown. Our framework sheds new light on classical game-solving algorithms, offering rigorous evidence and analytical tools to advance the understanding of these methods under a richer, more challenging, and yet tractable model.

Theory · Game Theory

Yilin LI, Yuan Deng, Wei Tang, Hanrui Zhang

Automated bidding to optimize online advertising with various constraints, e.g. ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI constraints. While prior work has addressed truthful auctions or non-truthful auctions with weaker benchmarks, this paper provides a significant improvement: We develop online bidding algorithms for repeated first-price auctions with ROI constraints, benchmarking against the optimal randomized strategy in hindsight. In the full feedback setting, where the maximum competing bid is observed, our algorithm achieves a near-optimal $\tilde O(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound, and in the bandit feedback setting (where the bidder only observes whether the bidder wins each auction), our algorithm attains $\tilde O(T^{3/4})$ regret bound.

Theory · Game Theory

Alistair Benford, Per Kristian Lehre

Competitive coevolutionary algorithms (CoEAs) have a natural application to problems that are adversarial or feature strategic interaction. However, there is currently limited theoretical insight into how to avoid pathological behaviour associated with CoEAs. In this paper we use impartial combinatorial games as a challenging domain for CoEAs and provide a corresponding runtime analysis. By analysing how individuals capitalise on the mistakes of their opponents, we prove that the Univariate Marginal Distribution Algorithm finds (with high probability) an optimal strategy for a game called Reciprocal LeadingOnes within $O(n^2\log^3{n})$ game evaluations, a significant improvement over the best known bound of $O(n^5\log^2{n})$. Critical to the analysis is the introduction of a novel stabilising operator, the impact of which we study both theoretically and empirically.

Theory · Game Theory

John Lazarsfeld, Georgios Piliouras, Ryann Sim, Stratis Skoulakis

This paper studies the *optimistic* variant of Fictitious Play for learning in two-player zero-sum games. While it is known that Optimistic FTRL -- a *regularized* algorithm with a bounded stepsize parameter -- obtains constant regret in this setting, we show for the first time that similar, optimal rates are also achievable *without* regularization: we prove for two-strategy games that Optimistic Fictitious Play (using *any* tiebreaking rule) obtains only *constant regret*, providing surprising new evidence on the ability of *non*-no-regret algorithms for fast learning in games. Our proof technique leverages a geometric view of Optimistic Fictitious Play in the dual space of payoff vectors, where we show a certain energy function of the iterates remains bounded over time. Additionally, we also prove a regret *lower bound* of $\Omega(\sqrt{T})$ for *Alternating* Fictitious Play. In the unregularized regime, this separates the ability of optimism and alternation in achieving $o(\sqrt{T})$ regret.

Theory · Learning Theory

Linjian Meng, Youzhi Zhang, Zhenxing Ge, Tianyu Ding, Shangdong Yang, Zheng Xu, Wenbin Li, Yang Gao

Regret Matching$^+$ (RM$^+$) variants are widely used to build superhuman Poker AIs, yet few studies investigate their last-iterate convergence in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE). Although their last-iterate convergence is established for games satisfying the Minty Variational Inequality (MVI), no studies have demonstrated that these algorithms achieve such convergence in the broader class of games satisfying the weak MVI. A key challenge in proving last-iterate convergence for RM$^+$ variants in games satisfying the weak MVI is that even if the game's loss gradient satisfies the weak MVI, RM$^+$ variants operate on a transformed loss feedback which does not satisfy the weak MVI. To provide last-iterate convergence for RM$^+$ variants, we introduce a concise yet novel proof paradigm that involves: (i) transforming an RM$^+$ variant into an Online Mirror Descent (OMD) instance that updates within the original strategy space of the game to recover the weak MVI, and (ii) showing last-iterate convergence by proving the distance between accumulated regrets converges to zero via the recovered weak MVI of the feedback. Inspired by our proof paradigm, we propose Smooth Optimistic Gradient Based RM$^+$ (SOGRM$^+$) and show that it achieves last-iterate and finite-time best-iterate convergence in learning an NE of games satisfying the weak MVI, the weakest condition among all known RM$^+$ variants. Experiments show that SOGRM$^+$ significantly outperforms other algorithms. Our code is available at https://github.com/menglinjian/NeurIPS-2025-SOGRM.

Theory · Game Theory

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Gabriele Farina

Correlated equilibria —and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria— are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of equilibrium computation are well-understood in some settings, fundamental questions are still open in _generalized games_, that is, games in which the set of strategies allowed to each player depends on the other players' strategies. These classes of games model fundamental settings in economics and have been a cornerstone of economics research since the seminal paper of Arrow and Debreu [1954]. Recently, there has been growing interest, both in economics and in computer science, in studying correlated equilibria in generalized games. It is known that finding a social welfare maximizing correlated equilibrium in generalized games is NP-hard. However, the existence of efficient algorithms to find _any_ equilibrium remains an important open question. In this paper, we answer this question negatively, showing that this problem is PPAD-complete.

Theory · Game Theory

Jiarui Gan, R Majumdar, Debmalya Mandal, Goran Radanovic

We study a stochastic principal-agent model. A principal and an agent interact in a stochastic environment, each privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit information from the agent and to signal her own information. The players communicate with each other and then select actions independently. Both players are {\em far-sighted}, aiming to maximize their total payoffs over the entire time horizon. We consider both the computation and learning of the principal's optimal policy. The key challenge lies in enabling {\em history-dependent} policies, which are essential for achieving optimality in this model but difficult to cope with because of the exponential growth of possible histories as the size of the model increases; explicit representation of history-dependent policies is infeasible as a result. To address this challenge, we develop algorithmic techniques based on the concept of {\em inducible value set}. The techniques yield an efficient algorithm that computes an $\epsilon$-approximate optimal policy in time polynomial in $1/\epsilon$. We also present an efficient learning algorithm for an episodic reinforcement learning setting with unknown transition probabilities. The algorithm achieves sublinear regret $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ for both players over $T$ episodes.

Theory · Reinforcement Learning and Planning

Erwan escudie, Matthia Sabatelli, Olivier Buffet, Jilles Dibangoye

We present a novel framework for \(\varepsilon\)-optimally solving two-player zero-sum partially observable stochastic games (zs-POSGs). These games pose a major challenge due to the absence of a principled connection with dynamic programming (DP) techniques developed for two-player zero-sum stochastic games (zs-SGs). Prior attempts at transferring solution methods have lacked a lossless reduction—defined here as a transformation that preserves value functions, equilibrium strategies, and optimality structure—thereby limiting generalisation to ad hoc algorithms. This work introduces the first lossless reduction from zs-POSGs to transition-independent zs-SGs, enabling the principled application of a broad class of DP-based methods. We show empirically that point-based value iteration (PBVI) algorithms, applied via this reduction, produce \(\varepsilon\)-optimal strategies across a range of benchmark domains, consistently matching or outperforming existing state-of-the-art methods. Our results open a systematic pathway for algorithmic and theoretical transfer from SGs to partially observable settings.

Theory · Game Theory

Weitong Zhang, Chengqi Zang, Bernhard Kainz

Large Language Models exhibit logical inconsistency across multi-turn inference processes, undermining correctness in complex inferential tasks. Challenges arise from ensuring that outputs align with both factual correctness and human intent. Approaches like single-agent reflection and multi-agent debate frequently prioritize consistency, but at the expense of accuracy. To address this problem, we propose a novel game-theoretic consensus mechanism that enables LLMs to self-check their outputs during the decoding stage of output generation. Our method models the decoding process as a multistage Bayesian Decoding Game, where strategic interactions dynamically converge to a consensus on the most reliable outputs without human feedback or additional training. Remarkably, our game design allows smaller models to outperform much larger models through game mechanisms (e.g., 78.1 LLaMA13B vs. 76.6 PaLM540B). As a model-agnostic method, our approach consistently improves even the latest models, enhancing DeepSeek-7B's performance on MMLU by 12.4%. Our framework effectively balances correctness and consistency, demonstrating that properly designed game-theoretic mechanisms can significantly enhance the self-verification capabilities of language models across various tasks and model architectures.

Theory · Reinforcement Learning and Planning

James Chapman, Kedar Karhadkar, Guido Montufar

Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has achieved remarkable success across multiple domains, including competitive games, natural language processing, and robotics. Despite these advancements, policies trained via DRL often struggle to generalize to evaluation environments with different parameters. This challenge is typically addressed by training with multiple contexts and/or by leveraging additional structure in the problem. However, obtaining sufficient training data across diverse contexts can be impractical in real-world applications. In this work, we consider contextual Markov decision processes (CMDPs) with transition and reward functions that exhibit regularity in context parameters. We introduce the context-enhanced Bellman equation (CEBE) to improve generalization when training on a single context. We prove both analytically and empirically that the CEBE yields a first-order approximation to the Q function trained across multiple contexts. We then derive context sample enhancement (CSE) as an efficient data augmentation method for approximating the CEBE in deterministic control environments. We numerically validate the performance of CSE in simulation environments, showcasing its potential to improve generalization in DRL.

Theory · Learning Theory

Soumita Hait, Ping Li, Haipeng Luo, Mengxiao Zhang

In the classic expert problem, $\Phi$-regret measures the gap between the learner's total loss and that achieved by applying the best action transformation $\phi \in \Phi$. A recent work by Lu et al., [2025] introduced an adaptive algorithm whose regret against a comparator $\phi$ depends on a certain sparsity-based complexity measure of $\phi$, recovering and interpolating optimal bounds for standard regret notions such as external, internal, and swap regret. In this work, we propose a general idea to achieve an even better comparator-adaptive $\Phi$-regret bound via much simpler algorithms compared to Lu et al., [2025]. Specifically, we discover a prior distribution over all possible binary transformations and show that it suffices to achieve prior-dependent regret against these transformations. Then, we propose two concrete and efficient algorithms to achieve so, where the first one combines multiple copies of the kernelized Hedge algorithm of Farina et al., [2022], and the second one combines multiple copies of a variant of the BM-reduction [Blum and Mansour, 2007]. To further showcase the power of our methods and the advantages over Lu et al., [2025] besides the simplicity and better regret bounds, we also show that our second approach can be extended to the game setting to achieve accelerated and adaptive convergence rate to $\Phi$-equilibria for a class of general-sum games. When specified to the special case of correlated equilibria, our bound improves over the existing ones from Anagnostides et al., [2022a,b].

Theory · Game Theory

Eden Saig, Nir Rosenfeld

When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning creates a feedback loop that shapes both the model and the population of its users. In this work, we introduce evolutionary prediction games, a framework grounded in evolutionary game theory which models such feedback loops as natural-selection processes among groups of users. Our theoretical analysis reveals a gap between idealized and real-world learning settings: In idealized settings with unlimited data and computational power, repeated learning creates competition and promotes competitive exclusion across a broad class of behavioral dynamics. However, under realistic constraints such as finite data, limited compute, or risk of overfitting, we show that stable coexistence and mutualistic symbiosis between groups becomes possible. We analyze these possibilities in terms of their stability and feasibility, present mechanisms that can sustain their existence, and empirically demonstrate our findings.

Theory · Game Theory

Kushagra Gupta, Surya Murthy, Mustafa Karabag, Ufuk Topcu, David Fridovich-Keil

Cooperative bargaining games are widely used to model resource allocation and conflict resolution. Traditional solutions assume the mediator can access agents’ utility function values and gradients. However, there is an increasing number of settings, such as human-AI interactions, where utility values may be inaccessible or incomparable due to unknown, nonaffine transformations. To model such settings, we consider that the mediator has access only to agents' $\textit{most preferred directions}-$normalized utility gradients in the decision space. To this end, we propose a cooperative bargaining algorithm where a mediator has access to only the direction oracle of each agent. We prove that unlike popular approaches such as the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, our approach is invariant to monotonic nonaffine transformations, and that under strong convexity and smoothness assumptions, this approach enjoys global asymptotic convergence to Pareto stationary solutions. Moreover, we show that the bargaining solutions found by our algorithm also satisfy the axioms of symmetry and (under slightly stronger conditions) independence of irrelevant alternatives, which are popular in the literature. Finally, we conduct experiments in two domains, multi-agent formation assignment and mediated stock portfolio allocation, which validate these theoretical results.

Social Aspects · Accountability, Transparency and Interpretability

Hubert Baniecki, Maximilian Muschalik, Fabian Fumagalli, Barbara Hammer, Eyke Hüllermeier, Przemyslaw Biecek

Language-image pre-training (LIP) enables the development of vision-language models capable of zero-shot classification, localization, multimodal retrieval, and semantic understanding. Various explanation methods have been proposed to visualize the importance of input image-text pairs on the model's similarity outputs. However, popular saliency maps are limited by capturing only first-order attributions, overlooking the complex cross-modal interactions intrinsic to such encoders. We introduce faithful interaction explanations of LIP models (FIxLIP) as a unified approach to decomposing the similarity in vision-language encoders. FIxLIP is rooted in game theory, where we analyze how using the weighted Banzhaf interaction index offers greater flexibility and improves computational efficiency over the Shapley interaction quantification framework. From a practical perspective, we propose how to naturally extend explanation evaluation metrics, such as the pointing game and area between the insertion/deletion curves, to second-order interaction explanations. Experiments on the MS COCO and ImageNet-1k benchmarks validate that second-order methods, such as FIxLIP, outperform first-order attribution methods. Beyond delivering high-quality explanations, we demonstrate the utility of FIxLIP in comparing different models, e.g. CLIP vs. SigLIP-2.

Theory · Learning Theory

Federico Di Gennaro, Khaled Eldowa, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi

In contrast to the classic formulation of partial monitoring, linear partial monitoring can model infinite outcome spaces, while imposing a linear structure on both the losses and the observations. This setting can be viewed as a generalization of linear bandits where loss and feedback are decoupled in a flexible manner. In this work, we address a nonstochastic (adversarial), finite-actions version of the problem through a simple instance of the exploration-by-optimization method that is amenable to efficient implementation. We derive regret bounds that depend on the game structure in a more transparent manner than previous theoretical guarantees for this paradigm. Our bounds feature instance-specific quantities that reflect the degree of alignment between observations and losses, and resemble known guarantees in the stochastic setting. Notably, they achieve the standard $\sqrt{T}$ rate in easy (locally observable) games and $T^{2/3}$ in hard (globally observable) games, where $T$ is the time horizon. We instantiate these bounds in a selection of old and new partial information settings subsumed by this model, and illustrate that the achieved dependence on the game structure can be tight in interesting cases.

Theory · Game Theory

Kyriakos Lotidis, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Nicholas Bambos, Jose Blanchet

In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain invariant to small—but otherwise arbitrary—perturbations to the game’s payoff structure, and we provide a crisp geometric characterization thereof. Subsequently, we turn to the question of dynamic robustness, and we examine which equilibria may arise as stable limit points of the dynamics of “follow the regularized leader” (FTRL) in the presence of randomness and uncertainty. Despite their very distinct origins, we establish a structural correspondence between these two notions of robustness: strategic robustness implies dynamic robustness, and, conversely, the requirement of strategic robustness cannot be relaxed if dynamic robustness is to be maintained. Finally, we examine the rate of convergence to robust equilibria as a function of the underlying regularizer, and we show that entropically regularized learning converges at a geometric rate in games with affinely constrained action spaces.

Theory · Game Theory

Ziwei Li, Bo Sun, Zhiqiu Zhang, Mohammad Hajiesmaili, Binghan Wu, Lin Yang, Yang Gao

We introduce and study the Combinatorial Ski Rental (CSR) problem, which involves multiple items that can be rented or purchased, either individually or in combination. At each time step, a decision-maker must make an irrevocable buy-or-rent decision for items that have not yet been purchased, without knowing the end of the time horizon. We propose a randomized online algorithm, Sorted Optimal Amortized Cost (SOAC), that achieves the optimal competitive ratio. Moreover, SOAC can be extended to address various well-known ski rental variants, including the multi-slope, multi-shop, multi-commodity ski rental and CSR with upgrading problems. Building on the proposed SOAC algorithm, we further develop a learning-augmented algorithm that leverages machine-learned predictions to improve the performance of CSR. This algorithm is capable of recovering or improving upon existing results of learning-augmented algorithms in both the classic ski rental and multi-shop ski rental problems. Experimental results validate our theoretical analysis and demonstrate the advantages of our algorithms over baseline methods for ski rental problems.

Theory · Game Theory

Yang Cai, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei, Weiqiang Zheng

The convergence of online learning algorithms in games under self-play is a fundamental question in game theory and machine learning. Among various notions of convergence, last-iterate convergence is particularly desirable, as it reflects the actual decisions made by the learners and captures the day-to-day behavior of the learning dynamics. While many algorithms are known to converge in the average-iterate, achieving last-iterate convergence typically requires considerably more effort in both the design and the analysis of the algorithm. Somewhat surprisingly, we show in this paper that for a large family of games, there exists a simple black-box reduction that transforms the average iterates of an uncoupled learning dynamics into the last iterates of a new uncoupled learning dynamics, thus also providing a reduction from last-iterate convergence to average-iterate convergence. Our reduction applies to games where each player’s utility is linear in both their own strategy and the joint strategy of all opponents. This family includes two-player bimatrix games and generalizations such as multi-player polymatrix games. By applying our reduction to the Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm, we obtain new state-of-the-art last-iterate convergence rates for uncoupled learning dynamics in multi-player zero-sum polymatrix games: (1) an $O(\frac{\log d}{T})$ last-iterate convergence rate under gradient feedback, representing an exponential improvement in the dependence on the dimension $d$ (i.e., the maximum number of actions available to either player); and (2) an $\tilde{O}(d^{\frac{1}{5}}T^{-\frac{1}{5}})$ last-iterate convergence rate under bandit feedback, improving upon the previous best rates of $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{d}T^{-\frac{1}{8}})$ and $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{d}T^{-\frac{1}{6}})$.