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Theory · Game Theory

Lingxiao Huang, Nisheeth K. Vishnoi, Wenyang Xiao

As AI systems enter institutional workflows, workers must decide whether to delegate task execution to AI and how much effort to invest in verifying AI outputs, while institutions evaluate workers using outcome-based standards that may misalign with workers’ private costs. We model delegation and verification as the solution to a rational worker’s optimization problem, and define worker quality by evaluating an institution-centered utility (distinct from the worker’s objective) at the resulting optimal action. We formally characterize optimal worker workflows and show that AI induces *phase transitions*, where arbitrarily small differences in verification ability lead to sharply different behaviors. As a result, AI can amplify workers with strong verification reliability while degrading institutional worker quality for others who rationally over-delegate and reduce oversight, even when baseline task success improves and no behavioral biases are present. These results identify a structural mechanism by which AI reshapes institutional worker quality and amplifies quality disparities between workers with different verification reliability.

Theory · Game Theory

Ziyuan Huang, Lina Alkarmi, Mingyan Liu

Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly than genuine efforts. While existing studies on sequential strategic classification primarily focus on optimizing dynamic classifier weights, we depart from these weight-centric approaches by analyzing the design of classifier thresholds and difficulty progression within a multi-level promotion-relegation framework. Our model captures the critical inter-temporal incentives driven by an agent's farsightedness, skill retention, and a "leg-up" effect where qualification and attainment can be self-reinforcing. We characterize the agent’s optimal long-term strategy and demonstrate that a principal can design a sequence of thresholds to effectively incentivize honest effort. Crucially, we prove that under mild conditions, this mechanism enables agents to reach arbitrarily high levels solely through genuine improvement efforts.

Deep Learning · Large Language Models

Mahesh Ramesh, Kaousheik Jayakumar, Aswinkumar Ramkumar, Pavan Thodima, Aniket Rege, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis

Cooperative reasoning under incomplete information remains complex for both humans and multi-agent AI, requiring agents to transcend individual logic in favor of recursive Theory-of-Mind (ToM) and strategic coordination. To investigate these challenges, we conduct a large-scale evaluation of 17 state-of-the-art LLMs (4B–600B+) on Hanabi card game across 2–5 players. To examine their limitations, we analyze the impact of context engineering and scaffold robustness, ranging from minimal prompts (Watson setting) to Bayesian-motivated scaffolding (Sherlock setting) and multi-turn working memory (Mycroft setting). Our findings reveal that: (1) top-performing models can autonomously track game states via internal working memory, although not reliably, and (2) cross-play performance scales smoothly with model capability. However, even the best models (scoring ≈ 15/25) trail specialist human experts (> 20/25). We introduce and release two novel datasets: HanabiLogs (1,520 annotated trajectories) and HanabiRewards (560 games with dense move-level utilities). By fine-tuning a 4B open-weight model (Qwen3-Instruct) on our datasets, we achieve performance gains of up to 156%, bringing performance to within 3 points of a strong proprietary reasoning model (o4-mini) and surpassing the best non-reasoning model (GPT-4.1) by 52%. Crucially, our HanabiRewards RL-finetuned model further generalizes beyond Hanabi, improving performance on a cooperative group-guessing benchmark by 11%, temporal reasoning on EventQA by 6.4%, instruction-following on IFBench-800K by 1.7 Pass@10, and matching AIME 2025 mathematical reasoning Pass@10. Code and datasets are available at {redacted for double blind}.

Theory · Game Theory

Alon Eden, Kira Goldner, Eldar Kerner, Thodoris Tsilivis

We study mechanism design for the budget-feasible procurement problem, a natural problem that arises when a buyer wants to procure goods or services from multiple strategic sellers who each have a cost to provide that service, the buyer has a value for each service procured, but is constrained by a budget. In contrast to prior work, which has focused on buyer value maximization for this problem, we solve for optimal and approximately-optimal mechanisms for the objectives of buyer utility (value of procured services minus payments), welfare (value minus production costs), and generalizations of the two. For welfare, we design a simple mechanism that obtains a constant-factor approximation for the prior-free (worst-case) setting. As prior-free mechanisms fail to provide any guarantee for utility, even for a single seller, we consider Bayesian settings, where the buyer has distributional knowledge over sellers' costs. We first provide a utility-optimal mechanism that satisfies the buyer's budget constraint *in expectation*, then we show how to modify the mechanism to satisfy the budget constraint *ex-post*, for every realization of seller costs, while still obtaining near-optimal utility guarantees. Finally, we generalize our mechanisms to other objectives.

General Machine Learning · Transfer, Multitask and Meta-learning

Ali Vahedifar, Abhisek Ray, Qi Zhang

Continual learning enables neural networks to learn tasks sequentially without forgetting previously acquired knowledge. However, catastrophic forgetting, where performance on earlier tasks degrades sharply when learning new ones, remains a fundamental challenge. We address this problem with Shapley Neuron Valuation (SNV), a principled framework grounded in cooperative game theory that quantifies Neuron importance in continual learning. By selectively freezing important Neurons while keeping others plastic, SNV enables memory-free continual learning without architectural expansion. Extensive experiments show that SNV delivers substantial gains over memory-free baselines, achieving +19.50% accuracy on CIFAR-100 and +17.20% on TinyImageNet in the Class-IL setting. In Task-IL scenarios, SNV consistently surpasses existing memory-free approaches by large margins, reaching up to 9.08% higher accuracy on CIFAR-100 compared to the second-best memory-free method, while remaining competitive in comparison with memory-based methods.

Theory · Game Theory

Mikael Moller Hogsgaard

In this paper, we settle the problem of learning optimal linear contracts from data in the offline setting, where agent types are drawn from an unknown distribution and the principal's goal is to design a contract that maximizes her expected utility. Specifically, our analysis shows that the simple Empirical Utility Maximization (EUM) algorithm yields an $\varepsilon$-approximation of the optimal linear contract with probability at least $1-\delta$, using just $O(\ln(1/\delta) / \varepsilon^2)$ samples. This result improves upon previously known bounds and matches a lower bound from (Dütting et al., 2025) up to constant factors, thereby proving its optimality. Furthermore, our result establishes the stronger guarantee of uniform convergence: the empirical utility of every linear contract is a $\varepsilon$-approximation of its true expectation with probability at least $1-\delta$, using the same optimal $O(\ln(1/\delta) / \varepsilon^2)$ sample complexity.

Reinforcement Learning · Multi-agent

Yizhou Zhang, Eric Mazumdar

Learning stationary policies in infinite-horizon general-sum Markov games (MGs) remains a fundamental open problem in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). While stationary strategies are preferred for their practicality, computing stationary forms of classic game-theoretic equilibria is computationally intractable—a stark contrast to the comparative ease of solving single-agent RL or zero-sum games. To bridge this gap, we study Risk-averse Quantal response Equilibria (RQE), a solution concept rooted in behavioral game theory that incorporates risk aversion and bounded rationality. We demonstrate that RQE possesses strong regularity conditions that make it uniquely amenable to learning in MGs. We propose a novel two-timescale Actor-Critic algorithm characterized by a fast-timescale actor and a slow-timescale critic. Leveraging the regularity of RQE, we prove that this approach achieves global convergence with finite-sample guarantees. We empirically validate our algorithm in several environments to demonstrate superior convergence properties compared to risk-neutral baselines.

Deep Learning · Large Language Models

Mickel Liu, Liwei Jiang, Yancheng Liang, Simon Du, Yejin Choi, Tim Althoff, Natasha Jaques

Conventional large language model (LLM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint loop: attackers exploit a static model, then defenders patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential setup leads to attackers overfitting obsolete exploits while defenders perpetually lag behind emerging threats. To address this, we introduce Self-RedTeam, the first fully online self-play multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm that continuously co-evolves attacker and defender for robust safety alignment. A single policy self-plays as both attacker and defender, generating adversarial prompts and defending against them, with a reward model adjudicating outcomes. Each role uses hidden chain-of-thought for strategic planning. Grounded in two-player zero-sum game theory, we establish a theoretical safety guarantee: if the game converges to Nash Equilibrium, the defender produces safe responses against any adversarial input. Empirically, Self-RedTeam generalizes across five models from the Llama and Qwen families, uncovering more diverse attacks (+17.80% SBERT) and improving safety of RLHF-trained models by up to 95% across 14 benchmarks. Our work motivates a shift from reactive patching to proactive co-evolution, enabling LLM safety self-improvement via online self-play MARL.

Theory · Game Theory

Claire Chen, Yuheng Zhang, Xinyu Liu, Zixuan Xie, Shuze Liu, Nan Jiang

We study the problem of learning Nash equilibria in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. While existing approaches often rely on explicit pessimism to address distribution shift, we show that KL regularization alone suffices to stabilize learning and guarantee convergence. We first introduce Regularized Offline Sequential Equilibrium (ROSE), a theoretical framework that achieves a fast $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n)$ convergence rate under \textit{unilateral concentrability}, improving over the standard $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt{n})$ rates in unregularized settings. We then propose Sequential Offline Self-play Mirror Descent (SOS-MD), a practical model-free algorithm based on least-squares value estimation and iterative self-play updates. We prove that SOS-MD attains the same $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n)$ statistical rate with a linear iteration complexity.

Theory · Game Theory

Haris Aziz, Ling Gai, Yuhang Guo, Jeremy Vollen

We study the transit stop placement (TrSP) problem in general metric spaces, where agents travel between source–destination pairs and may either walk directly or utilize a shuttle service via selected transit stops. We investigate fairness in TrSP through the lens of justified representation (JR) and the core, and uncover a structural correspondence with fair clustering. Specifically, we show that a constant-factor approximation to proportional fairness in clustering can be used to guarantee a constant-factor bi-parameterized approximation to core. We establish a lower bound of $1.366$ on the approximability of JR, and moreover show that no clustering algorithm can approximate JR within a factor better than $3$. Going beyond clustering, we propose the Expanding Cost Algorithm, which achieves a tight $2.414$-approximation for JR, but does not give any bounded core guarantee. In light of this, we introduce a parameterized algorithm that interpolates between these approaches, and enables a tunable trade-off between JR and core. Finally, we complement our results with an experimental analysis using small-market public carpooling data.

Theory · Optimization

Yi Feng, Weiming Ou, Xiao Wang

The remarkable success of the Adam in training neural networks has naturally led to the widespread use of its descent-ascent counterpart, Adam-DA, for solving zero-sum games. Despite its popularity in practice, a rigorous theoretical understanding of Adam-DA still lags behind. In this paper, we derive ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that serve as continuous-time limits of the Adam-DA. These ODEs closely approximate the discrete-time dynamics of Adam-DA, providing a tractable analytical framework for understanding its behavior in zero-sum games. Using this ODE approach, we investigate two fundamental aspects of Adam-DA: local convergence and implicit gradient regularization. Our analysis reveals that the roles of the first- and second-order momentum parameters in zero-sum games are exactly the opposite of their well-documented effects in minimization problems. We validate these predictions through GAN experiments across multiple architectures and datasets, demonstrating the practical implications of this reversed momentum effect.

Theory · Game Theory

Qichuan Yin, Ziwei Su, Shuangning Li

Human labeling increasingly relies on AI assistance, raising incentive challenges when annotators’ effort is unobserved. Recent work by Bastani & Cachon (2025); Sambasivan et al. (2021) shows that accuracy-based payment schemes suffer from incentive collapse: as AI accuracy improves, sustaining positive human effort requires unbounded payments. We study this problem in a budget-constrained setting with strategic annotators whose labeling accuracy depends on unobserved effort. We propose a sentinel-auditing payment mechanism that enforces a strictly positive and controllable level of human effort at finite cost, independent of AI accuracy. Building on this incentive-robust foundation, we develop an incentive-aware active statistical inference framework that jointly optimizes (i) the auditing rate and (ii) active sampling and budget allocation across instances of varying difficulty to minimize the final statistical loss under a single budget. Experiments demonstrate improved cost–error tradeoffs relative to standard active learning and auditing-only baselines.

Theory · Game Theory

ARNAB MAITI, Junyan Liu, Kevin Jamieson, Lillian Ratliff

We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has $n \ge 2$ players who simultaneously choose prices from the set {$1/k, 2/k, \ldots, 1$}, where $k\in\mathbb{N}$. The player who sets the lowest price captures the entire demand; if multiple players tie for the lowest price, they split the demand equally. We study the Bertrand paradox, where classical theory predicts low prices, yet real markets often sustain high prices. To understand this gap, we analyze a repeated-game model in which firms set prices using no-regret learners. Our goal is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can arise under different no-regret learning guarantees. We are particularly interested in questions such as whether no-external-regret learners can converge to undesirable high-price outcomes, and how stronger guarantees such as no-swap regret shape the emergence of competitive low-price behavior. We address these and related questions through a theoretical analysis, complemented by experiments that support the theory and reveal surprising phenomena for no-swap regret learners.

Theory · Optimization

Ioannis Anagnostides, Rohan Chauhan, Ioannis Panageas, Tuomas Sandholm, Jingming Yan

Performative prediction captures the phenomenon where deploying a predictive model shifts the underlying data distribution. While simple retraining dynamics are known to converge linearly when the performative effects are weak ($\rho < 1$), the complexity in the regime $\rho > 1$ was hitherto open. In this paper, we establish a sharp phase transition: computing an $\epsilon$-performatively stable point is PPAD-complete---and thus polynomial-time equivalent to Nash equilibria in general-sum games---even when $\rho = 1 + O(\epsilon)$. This intractability persists even in the ostensibly simple setting with a quadratic loss function and linear distribution shifts. One of our key technical contributions is to extend this PPAD-hardness result to general convex domains, which is of broader interest in the complexity of variational inequalities. Finally, we address the special case of strategic classification, showing that computing a strategic local optimum is PLS-hard.

Theory · Game Theory

Haoran Sun, Xia Xuanzhi, Xu Chu, Xiaotie Deng

Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the payment form is fixed, AMA's expressiveness is restricted, especially in distributions where bidders' valuations are correlated. In this paper, we propose Correlation-Aware AMA (CA-AMA), a novel framework that augments AMA with a new correlation-aware payment. We show that any CA-AMA preserves the DSIC property and formalize finding optimal CA-AMA as a constraint optimization problem subject to the IR constraint. Then, we theoretically characterize scenarios where classic AMAs can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to the optimal revenue, while the CA-AMA can reach the optimal revenue. For optimizing CA-AMA, we design a practical two-stage training algorithm. We derive that the target function's continuity and the generalization bound on the degree of deviation from strict IR. Finally, extensive experiments showcase that our algorithm can find an approximate optimal CA-AMA in various distributions with improved revenue and a low degree of violation of IR.

Theory · Game Theory

Kenshi Abe, Mitsuki Sakamoto, Kaito Ariu, Atsushi Iwasaki

This paper proposes an asymmetric perturbation technique for solving bilinear saddle-point optimization problems, commonly arising in minimax problems, game theory, and constrained optimization. Perturbing payoffs or values is known to be effective in stabilizing learning dynamics and equilibrium computation. However, it requires decreasing perturbation magnitudes to ensure convergence to an equilibrium in the underlying game, resulting in a slower rate. To overcome this, we introduce an asymmetric perturbation approach, where only one player's payoff function is perturbed. Exploiting the near-linear structure of bilinear problems, we show that, for a sufficiently small perturbation, the equilibrium strategy of the asymmetrically perturbed game coincides with an equilibrium strategy of the original game. Building on this property, we develop a perturbation-based learning algorithm with a linear last-iterate convergence rate to an equilibrium strategy of the original game, and we further show how to construct a parameter-free procedure that retains a linear rate. Finally, we empirically demonstrate fast convergence toward equilibria in both normal-form and extensive-form games.

Theory · Game Theory

Kenshi Abe, Mitsuki Sakamoto, Kaito Ariu, Atsushi Iwasaki

This paper proposes an asymmetric perturbation technique for solving bilinear saddle-point optimization problems, commonly arising in minimax problems, game theory, and constrained optimization. Perturbing payoffs or values is known to be effective in stabilizing learning dynamics and equilibrium computation. However, it requires decreasing perturbation magnitudes to ensure convergence to an equilibrium in the underlying game, resulting in a slower rate. To overcome this, we introduce an asymmetric perturbation approach, where only one player's payoff function is perturbed. Exploiting the near-linear structure of bilinear problems, we show that, for a sufficiently small perturbation, the equilibrium strategy of the asymmetrically perturbed game coincides with an equilibrium strategy of the original game. Building on this property, we develop a perturbation-based learning algorithm with a linear last-iterate convergence rate to an equilibrium strategy of the original game, and we further show how to construct a parameter-free procedure that retains a linear rate. Finally, we empirically demonstrate fast convergence toward equilibria in both normal-form and extensive-form games.

Theory · Game Theory

Rui Zheng, Ryann Sim, Antonios Varvitsiotis

Extensive-form games (EFGs) provide a powerful framework for modeling sequential decision making, capturing strategic interaction under imperfect information, chance events, and temporal structure. Most positive algorithmic and theoretical results for EFGs assume perfect recall, where players remember all past information and actions. We study the increasingly relevant setting of imperfect-recall EFGs (IREFGs), where players may forget parts of their history or previously acquired information, and where equilibrium computation is provably hard. We propose sum-of-squares (SOS) hierarchies for computing ex-ante optimal strategies in single-player IREFGs and Nash equilibria in multi-player IREFGs, working over behavioral strategies. Our theoretical results show that (i) these hierarchies converge asymptotically, (ii) under genericity assumptions, the convergence is finite, and (iii) in single-player non-absentminded IREFGs, convergence occurs at a finite level determined by the number of information sets. Finally, we introduce the new classes of (SOS)-concave and (SOS)-monotone IREFGs, and show that in the single-player setting the SOS hierarchy converges at the first level, enabling equilibrium computation with a single semidefinite program (SDP).

Theory · Game Theory

David Yang, Yuan Gao, Tianyi Lin, Christian Kroer

We introduce, to our knowledge, the first direct second-order method for computing Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. To do so, we construct a Douglas-Rachford-style splitting formulation, which we then solve with a semi-smooth Newton (SSN) method. We show that our algorithm enjoys local superlinear convergence. To augment the fast local behavior of our SSN method with global efficiency guarantees, we develop a hybrid method that combines our SSN method with the state-of-the-art first-order method for game solving, Predictive Regret Matching (PRM$^+$). Our hybrid algorithm leverages the global progress provided by PRM$^+$ while achieving a local superlinear convergence rate once it switches to SSN near a Nash equilibrium. Numerical experiments on matrix games demonstrate order-of-magnitude speedups over PRM$^+$ for high-precision solutions.

Theory · Optimization

Motahareh Sohrabi, Jianxin You, Simon Lacoste-Julien, Eduard Gorbunov, Gauthier Gidel

We study first-order methods for solving monotone variational inequalities arising in min-max optimization. Classical approaches such as the extragradient method rely on two gradient queries per iteration, which limits their analysis and applicability in the online and stochastic settings. We propose a family of Generalized Optimistic Methods with Anchoring (GOMA), which combine two time-scale optimistic updates with an anchoring term inspired by Halpern iteration. In particular, we show that for monotone Lipschitz operators, GOMA achieves an accelerated last-iterate convergence rate of $\mathcal{O}(1/k^2)$ in the squared gradient norm which is optimal. We also show that in stochastic games where classical methods, such as the extragradient and optimistic method, fail, GOMA can converge. Theoretically, we show that it has a last-iterate convergence rate of $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{k})$ for monotone Lipschitz operators in stochastic regimes with linearly increasing minibatches.