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2,111篇论文匹配“Security”
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Soumadeep Saha, Akshay Chaturvedi, Joy Mahapatra, Utpal Garain

User authorization-based access privileges are a key feature in many safety-critical systems, but have not been extensively studied in the large language model (LLM) realm. In this work, drawing inspiration from such access control systems, we introduce sudoLLM, a novel framework that results in multi-role aligned LLMs, i.e., LLMs that account for, and behave in accordance with, user access rights. sudoLLM injects subtle user-based biases into queries and trains an LLM to utilize this bias signal in order to produce sensitive information if and only if the user is authorized. We present empirical results demonstrating that this approach shows substantially improved alignment, generalization, resistance to prefix-based jailbreaking attacks, and “fails-closed”. The persistent tension between the language modeling objective and safety alignment, which is often exploited to jailbreak LLMs, is somewhat resolved with the aid of the injected bias signal. Our framework is meant as an additional security layer, and complements existing guardrail mechanisms for enhanced end-to-end safety with LLMs.

Alexandre Costa Ferro Filho, Rafaello Virgilli, Lucas Alcantara Souza, F S de Oliveira, Marcelo Henrique Lopes Ferreira, Daniel Tunnermann, Gustavo Dos Reis Oliveira, Anderson Da Silva Soares, Arlindo Rodrigues Galvão Filho

The detection of audio deepfakes (ADD) has become increasingly important due to the rapid evolution of generative speech models. However, progress in this field remains uneven across languages, particularly for low-resource languages like Portuguese, which lack high-quality datasets. In this paper, we introduce BRSpeech-DF, the first publicly available ADD dataset for Portuguese, encompassing both Brazilian and European variants. The dataset contains over 458,000 utterances, including a smaller portion of real speech from 62 speakers and a large collection of synthetic samples generated using multiple zero-shot text-to-speech (TTS) models, each conditioned on the original speaker’s voice. By providing this resource, our objective is to support the development of robust, multilingual detection systems, thereby advancing equity in speech forensics and security research. BRSpeech-DF addresses a significant gap in annotated data for underrepresented languages, facilitating more inclusive and generalizable advancements in synthetic speech detection.

Boyang Zhang, Yicong Tan, Yun Shen, Ahmed Salem, Michael Backes, Savvas Zannettou, Yang Zhang

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. Through the usage of tools, these systems can perform actions in the real world. Given the agents’ practical applications and ability to execute consequential actions, such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone LLM if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination defense methods. Our findings indicate these attacks are more difficult to detect compared to previous overtly harmful attacks, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

Witold Sosnowski, Arkadiusz Modzelewski, Kinga Skorupska, Adam Wierzbicki

Disinformation poses a significant threat to democratic societies, public health, and national security. To address this challenge, fact-checking experts analyze and track disinformation narratives. However, the process of manually identifying these narratives is highly time-consuming and resource-intensive. In this article, we introduce DiNaM, the first algorithm and structured framework specifically designed for mining disinformation narratives. DiNaM uses a multi-step approach to uncover disinformation narratives. It first leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to detect false information, then applies clustering techniques to identify underlying disinformation narratives. We evaluated DiNaM’s performance using ground-truth disinformation narratives from the EUDisinfoTest dataset. The evaluation employed the Weighted Chamfer Distance (WCD), which measures the similarity between two sets of embeddings: the ground truth and the predicted disinformation narratives. DiNaM achieved a state-of-the-art WCD score of 0.73, outperforming general-purpose narrative mining methods by a notable margin of 16.4–24.7%. We are releasing DiNaM’s codebase and the dataset to the public.

Sifan Li, Yujun Cai, Yiwei Wang

Vision-language models (VLMs) excel in semantic tasks but falter at a core human capability: detecting hidden content in optical illusions or AI-generated images through perceptual adjustments like zooming. We introduce HC-Bench, a benchmark of 112 images with hidden texts, objects, and illusions, revealing that leading VLMs achieve near-zero accuracy (0–5.36%) even with explicit prompting. Humans resolve such ambiguities instinctively, yet VLMs fail due to an overreliance on high-level semantics. Strikingly, we propose SemVink (Semantic Visual Thinking) by simply scaling images to low resolutions, which unlocks over 99% accuracy by eliminating redundant visual noise. This exposes a critical architectural flaw: VLMs prioritize abstract reasoning over low-level visual operations crucial for real-world robustness. Our work urges a shift toward hybrid models integrating multi-scale processing, bridging the gap between computational vision and human cognition for applications in medical imaging, security, and beyond.

Guanyu Hou, Jiaming He, Yinhang Zhou, Ji Guo, Yitong Qiao, Rui Zhang, Wenbo Jiang

Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, yet their robustness against malicious audio injection remains underexplored. To address this gap, this study systematically evaluates five leading LALMs across four attack scenarios: Audio Interference Attack, Instruction Following Attack, Context Injection Attack, and Judgment Hijacking Attack. We quantitatively assess their vulnerabilities and resilience using metrics: the Defense Success Rate, Context Robustness Score, and Judgment Robustness Index. The experiments reveal significant performance disparities, with no single model demonstrating consistent robustness across all attack types. Attack effectiveness is significantly influenced by the position of the malicious content, particularly when injected at the beginning of a sequence. Furthermore, our analysis uncovers a negative correlation between a model’s instruction-following capability and its robustness: models that strictly adhere to instructions tend to be more susceptible, whereas safety-aligned models exhibit greater resistance. To facilitate future research, this work introduces a comprehensive benchmark framework. Our findings underscore the critical need for integrating robustness into training pipelines and developing multi-modal defenses, ultimately facilitating the secure deployment of LALMs. The dataset used in this work is available on Hugging Face.

Hao Wang, Hao Li, Junda Zhu, Xinyuan Wang, Chengwei Pan, Minlie Huang, Lei Sha

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to generating harmful content when prompted with carefully crafted inputs, a vulnerability known as LLM jailbreaking. As LLMs become more powerful, studying jailbreak methods is critical to enhancing security and aligning models with human values. Traditionally, jailbreak techniques have relied on suffix addition or prompt templates, but these methods suffer from limited attack diversity. This paper introduces DiffusionAttacker, an end-to-end generative approach for jailbreak rewriting inspired by diffusion models. Our method employs a sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) text diffusion model as a generator, conditioning on the original prompt and guiding the denoising process with a novel attack loss. Unlike previous approaches that use autoregressive LLMs to generate jailbreak prompts, which limit the modification of already generated tokens and restrict the rewriting space, DiffusionAttacker utilizes a seq2seq diffusion model, allowing more flexible token modifications. This approach preserves the semantic content of the original prompt while producing harmful content. Additionally, we leverage the Gumbel-Softmax technique to make the sampling process from the diffusion model’s output distribution differentiable, eliminating the need for iterative token search. Extensive experiments on Advbench and Harmbench demonstrate that DiffusionAttacker outperforms previous methods across various evaluation metrics, including attack success rate (ASR), fluency, and diversity.

Chung-Nan Tsai, Xin Wang, Cheng-Hsiung Lee, Ching-Sheng Lin

While large language models (LLMs) have shown strong capabilities across diverse domains, their application to code vulnerability detection holds great potential for identifying security flaws and improving software safety. In this paper, we propose a sequential multi-stage approach via confidence- and collaboration-based decision making (ConfColl). The system adopts a three-stage sequential classification framework, proceeding through a single agent, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) with external examples, and multi-agent reasoning enhanced with RAG. The decision process selects among these strategies to balance performance and cost, with the process terminating at any stage where a high-certainty prediction is achieved. Experiments on a benchmark dataset and a low-resource language demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework in enhancing code vulnerability detection performance.

Yohei Seki, Hakusen Shu, Anaïs Lhuissier, Hanwool Lee, Juyeon Kang, Min-Yuh Day, Chung-Chi Chen

Promises made by politicians, corporate leaders, and public figures have a significant impact on public perception, trust, and institutional reputation. However, the complexity and volume of such commitments, coupled with difficulties in verifying their fulfillment, necessitate innovative methods for assessing their credibility. This paper introduces the concept of Promise Verification, a systematic approach involving steps such as promise identification, evidence assessment, and the evaluation of timing for verification. We propose the first multilingual dataset, ML-Promise, which includes English, French, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, aimed at facilitating in-depth verification of promises, particularly in the context of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reports. Given the growing emphasis on corporate environmental contributions, this dataset addresses the challenge of evaluating corporate promises, especially in light of practices like greenwashing. Our findings also explore textual and image-based baselines, with promising results from retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) approaches. This work aims to foster further discourse on the accountability of public commitments across multiple languages and domains.

Amit Giloni, Chiara Picardi, Roy Betser, Shamik Bose, Aishvariya Priya Rathina Sabapathy, Roman Vainshtein

An Agentic AI Workflow (AAW), also known as an LLM-based multi-agent system, is an autonomous system that assembles several LLM-based agents to work collaboratively towards a shared goal. The high autonomy, widespread adoption, and growing interest in such AAWs highlight the need for a deeper understanding of their operations, from both quality and security aspects. To this day, there are no existing methods to assess the influence of each agent on the AAW’s final output. Adopting techniques from related fields is not feasible since existing methods perform only static structural analysis, which is unsuitable for inference time execution. We present Counterfactual-based Agent Influence Ranker (CAIR) - the first method for assessing the influence level of each agent on the AAW’s output and determining which agents are the most influential. By performing counterfactual analysis, CAIR provides a task-agnostic analysis that can be used both offline and at inference time. We evaluate CAIR using an AAWs dataset of our creation, containing 30 different use cases with 230 different functionalities. Our evaluation showed that CAIR produces consistent rankings, outperforms baseline methods, and can easily enhance the effectiveness and relevancy of downstream tasks.

Asif Hanif, Maha Tufail Agro, Fahad Shamshad, Karthik Nandakumar

Prompt learning has emerged as an efficient alternative to full fine-tuning for adapting large audio-language models (ALMs) to downstream tasks. While this paradigm enables scalable deployment via Prompt-as-a-Service frameworks, it also introduces a critical yet underexplored security risk of backdoor attacks. In this work, we present TrojanWave, the first backdoor attack tailored to the prompt-learning setting in frozen ALMs. Unlike prior audio backdoor methods that require training from scratch on full datasets, TrojanWave injects backdoors solely through learnable prompts, making it highly scalable and effective in few-shot settings. TrojanWave injects imperceptible audio triggers in both time and spectral domains to effectively induce targeted misclassification during inference. To mitigate this threat, we further propose TrojanWave-Defense, a lightweight prompt purification method that neutralizes malicious prompts without hampering the clean performance. Extensive experiments across 11 diverse audio classification benchmarks demonstrate the robustness and practicality of both the attack and defense. Our code is publicly available at https://asif-hanif.github.io/trojanwave/.

Shuangjie Fu, Du Su, Beining Huang, Fei Sun, Jingang Wang, Wei Chen, Huawei Shen, Xueqi Cheng

To confront the ever-evolving safety risks of LLMs, automated jailbreak attacks have proven effective for proactively identifying security vulnerabilities at scale. Existing approaches, including GCG and AutoDAN, modify adversarial prompts to induce LLMs to generate responses that strictly follow a fixed affirmative template. However, we observed that the reliance on the rigid output template is ineffective for certain malicious requests, leading to suboptimal jailbreak performance. In this work, we aim to develop a method that is universally effective across all hostile requests. To achieve this, we explore LLMs’ intrinsic safety mechanism: a refusal stance towards the adversarial prompt is formed in a confined region and ultimately leads to a rejective response. In light of this, we propose Stance Manipulation (SM), a novel automated jailbreak approach that generates jailbreak prompts to suppress the refusal stance and induce affirmative responses. Our experiments across four mainstream open-source LLMs demonstrate the superiority of SM’s performance. Under commenly used setting, SM achieves success rates over 77.1% across all models on Advbench. Specifically, for Llama-2-7b-chat, SM outperforms the best baseline by 25.4%. In further experiments with extended iterations in a speedup setup, SM achieves over 92.2% attack success rate across all models. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/Zed630/Stance-Manipulation.

Amirbek Djanibekov, Nurdaulet Mukhituly, Kentaro Inui, Hanan Aldarmaki, Nils Lukas

Speech Language Models (SLMs) enable natural interactions via spoken instructions, which more effectively capture user intent by detecting nuances in speech. The richer speech signal introduces new security risks compared to text-based models, as adversaries can better bypass safety mechanisms by injecting imperceptible noise to speech. We analyze adversarial attacks under white-box access and find that SLMs are substantially more vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which can achieve a perfect 100% attack success rate in some instances. To improve security, we propose post-hoc patching defenses used to intervene during inference by modifying the SLM’s activations that improve robustness up to 99% with (i) negligible impact on utility and (ii) without any re-training. We conduct ablation studies to maximize the efficacy of our defenses and improve the utility/security trade-off, validated with large-scale benchmarks unique to SLMs.

Xiaoqun Liu, Jiacheng Liang, Luoxi Tang, Muchao Ye, Weicheng Ma, Zhaohan Xi

Large language models (LLMs) are widely adapted for downstream applications through fine-tuning, a process named customization. However, recent studies have identified a vulnerability during this process, where malicious samples can compromise the robustness of LLMs and amplify harmful behaviors. To address this challenge, we propose an adaptive data curation approach allowing any text to be curated to enhance its effectiveness in counteracting harmful samples during customization. To avoid the need for additional defensive modules, we further introduce a comprehensive mitigation framework spanning the lifecycle of the customization process: before customization to immunize LLMs against future compromise attempts, during customization to neutralize risks, and after customization to restore compromised models. Experimental results demonstrate a significant reduction in compromising effects, achieving up to a 100% success rate in generating safe responses. By combining adaptive data curation with lifecycle-based mitigation strategies, this work represents a solid step forward in mitigating compromising risks and ensuring the secure adaptation of LLMs.

Yao-Ching Yu, Tsun-Han Chiang, Cheng-Wei Tsai, Chien-Ming Huang, Wen-Kwang Tsao

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable advancements in specialized fields such as finance, law, and medicine. However, in cybersecurity, we have noticed a lack of open-source datasets, with a particular lack of high-quality cybersecurity pretraining corpora, even though much research indicates that LLMs acquire their knowledge during pretraining. To address this, we present a comprehensive suite of datasets covering all major training stages, including pretraining, instruction fine-tuning, and reasoning distillation with cybersecurity-specific self-reflection data. Extensive ablation studies demonstrate their effectiveness on public cybersecurity benchmarks. In particular, continued pre-training on our dataset yields a **15.9%** improvement in the aggregate score, while reasoning distillation leads to a **15.8%** gain in security certification (CISSP). We will release all datasets and trained cybersecurity LLMs under the ODC-BY and MIT licenses to encourage further research in the community.

Miao Ziqi, Yi Ding, Lijun Li, Jing Shao

With the emergence of strong vision language capabilities, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated tremendous potential for real-world applications. However, the security vulnerabilities exhibited by the visual modality pose significant challenges to deploying such models in open-world environments.Recent studies have successfully induced harmful responses from target MLLMs by encoding harmful textual semantics directly into visual inputs. However, in these approaches, the visual modality primarily serves as a trigger for unsafe behavior, often exhibiting semantic ambiguity and lacking grounding in realistic scenarios. In this work, we define a novel setting: vision-centric jailbreak, where visual information serves as a necessary component in constructing a complete and realistic jailbreak context. Building on this setting, we propose the VisCo (Visual Contextual) Attack.VisCo fabricates contextual dialogue using four distinct vision-focused strategies, dynamically generating auxiliary images when necessary to construct a vision-centric jailbreak scenario.To maximize attack effectiveness, it incorporates automatic toxicity obfuscation and semantic refinement to produce a final attack prompt that reliably triggers harmful responses from the target black-box MLLMs. Specifically, VisCo achieves a toxicity score of 4.78 and an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 85% on MM-SafetyBench against GPT-4o, significantly outperforming the baseline, which achieves a toxicity score of 2.48 and an ASR of 22.2%. Code: https://github.com/Dtc7w3PQ/Visco-Attack.

Yifan Xia, Guorui Chen, Wenqian Yu, Zhijiang Li, Philip Torr, Jindong Gu

Large language models (LLMs) excel in diverse applications but face dual challenges: generating harmful content under jailbreak attacks and over-refusing benign queries due to rigid safety mechanisms. These issues severely affect the application of LLMs, especially in the medical and education fields. Existing approaches can be divided into three types: contrastive decoding, activation manipulation, and prompting strategies. However, all these approaches face challenges like inefficiency, fragility, or architectural constraints,ultimately failing to strike a balance between safety and usability. These problems are more obvious in multimodal large language models (MLLMs), especially in terms of heightened over-refusal in cross-modal tasks and new security risks arising from expanded attack surfaces. We propose Magic Image, an optimization-driven visual prompt framework that enhances security and reduces over-refusal at the same time. The Magic Image is optimized using gradients derived from harmful/benign training samples. Using the magic image can modify the model’s original safety alignment, maintaining robust safety while reducing unnecessary denials. Experiments demonstrate its effectiveness in preserving model performance and improving safety-responsiveness balance across datasets, including unseen data, offering a practical solution for reliable MLLM deployment.

Michael Sejr Schlichtkrull

When AI agents retrieve and reason over external documents, adversaries can manipulate the data they receive to subvert their behaviour. Previous research has studied indirect prompt injection, where the attacker injects malicious instructions. We argue that injection of instructions is not necessary to manipulate agents – attackers could instead supply biased, misleading, or false information. We term this an *attack by content*. Existing defenses, which focus on detecting hidden commands, are ineffective against attacks by content. To defend themselves and their users, agents must critically evaluate retrieved information, corroborating claims with external evidence and evaluating source trustworthiness. We argue that this is analogous to an existing NLP task, automated fact-checking, which we propose to repurpose as a cognitive self-defense tool for agents.

Arghodeep Nandi, Megha Sundriyal, Euna Mehnaz Khan, Jikai Sun, Emily K. Vraga, Jaideep Srivastava, Tanmoy Chakraborty

Misinformation remains one of the most significant issues in the digital age. While automated fact-checking has emerged as a viable solution, most current systems are limited to evaluating factual accuracy. However, the detrimental effect of misinformation transcends simple falsehoods; it takes advantage of how individuals perceive, interpret, and emotionally react to information. This underscores the need to move beyond factuality and adopt more human-centered detection frameworks. In this survey, we explore the evolving interplay between traditional fact-checking approaches and psychological concepts such as cognitive biases, social dynamics, and emotional responses. By analyzing state-of-the-art misinformation detection systems through the lens of human psychology and behavior, we reveal critical limitations of current methods and identify opportunities for improvement. Additionally, we outline future research directions aimed at creating more robust and adaptive frameworks, such as neuro-behavioural models that integrate technological factors with the complexities of human cognition and social influence. These approaches offer promising pathways to more effectively detect and mitigate the societal harms of misinformation.

Hanbo Huang, Yihan Li, Bowen Jiang, Bo Jiang, Lin Liu, Zhuotao Liu, Ruoyu Sun, Shiyu Liang

Privacy-sensitive users require deploying large language models (LLMs) within their own infrastructure (on-premises) to safeguard private data and enable customization. However, vulnerabilities in local environments can lead to unauthorized access and potential model theft. To address this, prior research on small models has explored securing only the output layer within hardware-secured devices to balance model confidentiality and customization. Yet this approach fails to protect LLMs effectively. In this paper, we discover that (1) query-based distillation attacks targeting the secured top layer can produce a functionally equivalent replica of the victim model; (2) securing the same number of layers, bottom layers before a transition layer provide stronger protection against distillation attacks than top layers, with comparable effects on customization performance; and (3) the number of secured layers creates a trade-off between protection and customization flexibility. Based on these insights, we propose SOLID, a novel deployment framework that secures a few bottom layers in a secure environment and introduces an efficient metric to optimize the trade-off by determining the ideal number of hidden layers. Extensive experiments on five models (1.3B to 70B parameters) demonstrate that SOLID outperforms baselines, achieving a better balance between protection and downstream customization.